Arms Control Wonk

After escaping the clutches of a term paper draft, it returns!

Associated Press | Whoops.  Seems like the people in charge of the most powerful weapons known to man just weren’t up to the job, and needed a bit of extra training.  Not the first mistake of this manner.

Navy Live | Apparently, the Navy actually listens to talk about nuclear force cuts.  Hint: it doesn’t really like it.

Breaking Defense | The SM-3 Block IB missile seems to be working, following three successful tests since May of 2012.

Breaking Defense (again) | The X-47B performed a touch-and-go landing on the USS George H.W. Bush.  I wonder what’s next?

Foreign Policy | New START implementation is facing opposition, never mind the New START follow-on.  Yousaf Butt proposes a DIY solution. Is the President listening?

FAS Strategic Security Blog | Apparently, the Pentagon’s China Report omitted some key facts about strategic nuclear forces.

Bloomberg | Gary Milhollin sees Iran’s nuclear plans as a long-term, not a near-term, threat.

Nukes of Hazard | Senator Graham just can’t get enough MOX money, can he?  But he really promises it wasn’t pork or anything!

We hope you enjoyed this installment of FYRP.

Over at our Proliferation Prevention Program blog, you can see what my boss and I wrote regarding “The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation at the US-ROK May 2013 Presidential Summit.”

The first result of the decision to delay for most in my former line of work is likely to be relief.  But two years is not that far away.  And in terms of difficulty, may not be enough time to agree on a longer-term, 30- or 40-year agreement if the South keeps pushing on the enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) door.  Congress has a role, and while it may be an imperfect place, our Constitution and our laws give us no other for adjudication of such matters.

It’s incumbent on the Administration to submit proposed language allowing this “extension” to come into force, and on Congress to examine it.  At a minimum, the cognizant Committees ought to hold a hearing to establish clear legislative history, just in case we find that in 2015 we see another extension of this agreement being considered along side other, tough 123 agreements.

So far, only  Voice of America has covered this matter.  Note to Jack Spencer over at Heritage.org:  What exactly is “proliferation-resistant used-fuel-management technology”?  What makes it resist proliferation?  And if it’s so good, why don’t we let everyone use it?

After a brief (SAT-induced) hiatus, it has returned!

Washington Examiner | Congressmen Doug Lamborn and Trent Franks give us their views on President Obama’s missile defense plans. Space-based interceptors are still needed, they say. How much that would cost?  And how practical that would be?

Lobe Log | Usha Sahay discusses the differences between Iran and North Korea.  With roads like these, how could anyone confuse the two?  More from Meir Javedanfar.

CS Monitor | Israel has ostensibly obvious motives for bombing Syria, but is it worth the risk?

FAS Strategic Security Blog | Russia’s SSBN fleet hasn’t been doing much. Come to think of it, the U.S.’s hasn’t been very active of late either.  The financial burdens of SSBN modernization are heavy both at home and abroad.  And while we’re reading the FAS blog, what are the Chinese doing with their ICBMs?

Department of Defense | The Pentagon’s eagerly awaited annual China military report has arrived, so now we know what the Chinese are doing with their ICBMs. Hey, now there’s a North Korea report along with it. There’s an Iran report, too, but you can’t read it.

Foreign Policy Association | Why is the NRA so interested in the ATT?  Scott Monje explains.

Aviation Week | The X-51A went really, really fast. Video.

The Diplomat | Despite being a phenomenal TV show, Battlestar Galactica cannot help us determine military policy.  Right?  Wrong, says James Holmes.

Japan Times | Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has lately been making some bold moves in cutting nuclear supply deals.  What is he heading towards?

We hope you enjoy this installment of FYRP.

Last week, I was lucky to be able to join NPT PrepCom-ers in Geneva to help present the recently completed UNIDIR study ‘A New START Model for Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament,’ carried out by Pavel Podvig, Phillip Schell, and myself.

The work is accessible on the recently launched nuclearforces.org website, where you can check out the overview report, the individual country reports, some nifty maps, or download the KMZ set.

As the P5 continue to seek ways to show up on their 2010 Action Plan commitments (especially those repeatedly mentioned by name that are related to disarmament, transparency, and reporting - Action 5, 20, & 21), the aim of this project was to demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of applying New START definitions and provisions more widely to the other NPT nuclear weapon states.  Yes, New START was specifically designed for the arsenals of Russia and the United States, so why would we do such a thing?  The overview report says it best:

Even though the New START transparency and accountability provisions were developed in the context of bilateral US–Russian nuclear arms control, they could be applied to the nuclear arsenals of other nuclear-weapon states. The key advantage of New START is that it provides a legal and organizational framework for nuclear reductions that has been thoroughly tested in practice. Extending this framework to all nuclear-weapon states would be a natural and direct way of building a comprehensive system that could ensure transparency and accountability in nuclear disarmament.

Over decades of trial and error, Russia and the United States have learned many a lesson in terms of what works and what doesn’t when it comes to effective mechanisms for transparency, notifications, inspections, and general verification in arms control.  Therefore, in thinking about a transparency system for pursuing multilateral disarmament in line with the 2010 Action Plan, we think it makes good sense to build upon this experience rather than to start from scratch.

In this project, using a variety of open sources and geospatial tools, we generated New START-type MOUs for each of the P5 states, which include the relevant aggregate numbers, facilities, geographic coordinates, and weapon system technical data.

Here are the New START-type aggregate totals for each state as of 1 September 2012:

(Data for the United States and the Russian Federation come from the biannual exchange required by New START, which contained data declared current as of 1 September 2012. Data for China, France, and the United Kingdom are estimates based on open-source information.)

The numbers might look a little strange at first, but this is what you get when you apply a consistent methodology (something that the open source community tends to be rather lax about) as defined in New START.  The treaty clearly defines an ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber based on range, it presents good definitions for determining deployment status, and the limits of the treaty provide a useful measure for determining which forces should be considered “strategic” if only for the purposes of consistent reporting across the P5. The detailed story behind each of these numbers can be found in the country reports, but here are a few key points:

• The only systems included in the aggregate numbers are those with ranges that meet requirements specified in New START (ICBMS, > 5500km; SLBMs, > 600km; Heavy Bombers, > 8000km or with nuclear long range (>600km) ALCMs)

• This data reflects the status of arsenals on the date of 1 September 2012, and therefore the numbers might look quite different on another date.  For instance, part of the reason the UK’s numbers are relatively low is because two submarines (as opposed to the usual one) were considered to be in overhaul on this date.

• The reason for the glaring zero in China’s deployed warheads category is due to the general belief that no warheads are actually mounted on China’s ballistic missiles.

The aggregate numbers in the table above do not present a complete picture of each state’s nuclear arsenal, but it’s a good starting point in terms of reporting.  More importantly, the framework and system that New START provides could of course be built upon over time to incorporate new weapon systems (i.e. Russian and U.S. non-strategic forces, French nuclear aircraft, and Chinese missiles with lower ranges) in a sustained and consistent manner.

In completing the MOUs for each state, it was also interesting how much of the necessary data was already available in the public domain.  Despite the fact that the United States removes the coordinates from its New START data releases and that Russia refuses to allow the disclosure of anything beyond its aggregate numbers, the MOUs for both of these states (including geographic coordinates for all facilities) could be rather easily assembled using open sources and Google Earth.  The same goes for the much shorter MOUs generated for France and the UK, which would each have very few facilities to report.  For China, the process required more effort, but thanks to the growing body of research and the increasing availability of commercial satellite imagery, we were able to identify many of the relevant facilities with reasonable confidence.

As an example, the map below shows nuclear forces bases and other facilities that would be included in China’s New START-type data exchange report.  Click on the image to go to the larger interactive version (tip: click on the ‘satellite’ option to be able to view the actual sites when zooming in):

With each succeeding Russian-U.S. arms control agreement, the definitions, mechanisms, and procedures have been adjusted to account for lessons learned.  New START stands as the most recent iteration of this process, and while it may not be perfect, it represents a history of cooperation and negotiated agreement between the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals.  Moreover, it contains many elements that could serve as a useful basis for elaborating a multilateral transparency and disarmament system.

As starting points go, we think that’s pretty good.

(For a more eloquent description of the project, also check out Pavel’s recent post.)

Another installment of the best (and only) regular ACW post!

The White House | “…varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used [sarin] on a small scale…” Joseph Holliday says that Assad has outfoxed Obama.

Nature | From prison in Iran, a graduate student writes that he refused to work on a laser-based enrichment program meant for military purposes.

Yonhap News | North Korea has moved two Scud missile launchers to its east coast.  Should we be afraid?

38 North | Still no missile tests, but North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric keeps escalating. Byung Chul Lee makes the case for engagement.  Related: Jeffrey Lewis makes the case for taking the nuclear threat at face value. Elbridge Colby makes the case for reasserting U.S. nuclear deterrence.

The Sun | Where Kim Jong-un learned theatrics.

CTBTO | Radioactivity detected after North Korea’s February 12^th nuclear test confirms that the test occurred. Time to update this website?

The New York Times | James Acton asks, is China changing its position on nuclear weapons? No, says Yao Yunzhu. No, says M. Taylor Fravel.  No, says Gregory Kulacki, and let’s stop nagging them about it.  (Acton responds to Yao and Fravel. Rachel Oswald reviews the debate.)

New Statesman | Kate Hudson of the UK’s Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament thinks the U.S. will make Britain give up its nukes. Maybe as soon as the U.S. finishes cutting a leg off the Triad?

Washington Post | Champion of fiscal restraint Lindsey Graham (here is his voting record) is up in arms about another spending cut.  No history of pork there.  But that’d be great.

We hope you enjoyed this installment of FYRP.

Another installment of your new favorite post!

National Journal | It’s starting to feel like Fall 2001 all over again, says George Condon, Jr., what with terrorism and all in the USA. I may be young, George, but it’s really nothing like then.

Korea Herald | North Korea is not poised to attack the South, says senior U.S. military official, notwithstanding all the sound and fury. Also, more on missiles and nukes from DNI James Clapper. Remember this missile-test footage?

Taiwan Focus | China has not yet deployed either the JL-2 SLBM or the DF-41 road-mobile, multi-warhead ICBM, says senior Taiwan military official. (h/t Global Security Newswire)

Xinhua | China has released a new defense white paper about “peacetime employment of armed forces.” This is the full document.

Global Security Newswire | Arab League foreign ministries might not boycott the 2013 NPT PrepCom after all, Elaine Grossman reports.

Associated Press | Iran installs more IR-2m centrifuges. This should spark some debate.

The Times | Porton Down scientists allegedly find evidence of Syria CW use… not otherwise specified. (Teaser only for non-subscribers. Here’s the gist.) The Syrian government is preventing further investigation.

RIA Novosti | Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin says that U.S. BMD “poses no military threat” to Russia. Apparently, the asteroid threat takes precedence. We should call in these guys.

We hope that this news dose can last until the next FYRP.

Yes, it’s another edition of For Your Reading Pleasure!

Center for Public Integrity | R. Jeffrey Smith reports that the Obama administration is shifting funds from nonproliferation to the nuclear weapons complex. More from John Fleck. More from Kingston Reif. More from Stephen Young.

YouTube | Excerpt from President Obama’s speech of April 5, 2009.

The State | Some aren’t too happy with the proposed cuts.  Fiscal responsibility only goes so far.

Verification, Implementation and Compliance | Andreas Persbo says nuclear policy wonks at the Carnegie Conference have a “hangover.” But they like to Tweet.

Russian Forces | Pavel Podvig asks, did Star Wars really end the Cold War?

Washington Free Beacon | Bill Gertz asks, did the Cold War really end?

The Foundry | Ex-intel analyst Bruce Klingner puts the DIA’s assessment of North Korean nuclear missiles into perspective. More from George Little.

The Borowitz Report | Andy Borowitz: U.S. cyber-offense capabilities will thwart the North Korean threat.  He must have received this press release.

We hope that these articles provide ample discussion and debate material until the next FYRP.

[Tom Moore turns a gimlet eye to what is, and what isn't, in the President's budget for nuclear modernization. LRSO = Long Range Stand Off, an Air Force program for replacement of the Air Launched Cruise Missile. -Ed.]

Modernizes the Nation’s Nuclear Deterrent. (at pp. 72-73)

The Administration remains committed to reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons in support of our national security strategy, to modernizing the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex, and to supporting the goals of the Nuclear Posture Review as the United States and Russia implement the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The Budget proposes $12 billion for strategic offensive forces, $600 million or five percent, less than the 2012 enacted level; the principal reason for the decrease was the two-year slip in the funding profile for the OHIO Class replacement. To ensure that the strategic bomber fleet will be able to conduct future missions, DOD is continuing to develop a new long-range bomber.

DOD continues to review possible reductions in delivery systems to ensure that the New START thresholds are met on schedule. Close cooperation between DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at the Department of Energy has resulted in modified weapons system requirements that focus on the highest-priority capabilities. DOD and NNSA continue to ensure that plutonium component production and research capabilities are maintained at required levels, and have increased resources for several programs to extend the service lives of nuclear weapons, as well as for one ongoing major capital asset project, the Uranium Processing Facility. Reflecting their close partnership and shared commitment, DOD continues to provide budgetary support to NNSA.

Modernizes the Nation’s Nuclear Deterrent. (at pp. 89-90)

That all sounds very nice, eh?  But, a hem, what  about this?–You know, the “90-day review”?

Wonks of all stripes:  Keep your eyes fixed on plans for LRSO, as rumorint has it that certain folks might like not to proceed with it.

Also, note that the “unprecedented cooperative analysis and planning process jointly conducted by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense (DOD)”  hasn’t resulted in saving the taxpayer a dime, nor in better managing the deterrent.  This is, in large part, due to what Congress does with the money that DOD gives the NNSA, and, in turn, NNSA’s inability to work to get a better grip on the requirements-generation process for the B-61 LEP.

A modest proposal:  The Administration should announce a halt to its arms control agenda until it conducts an assessment of how it will obtain what it requests from Congress for modernization.  Keep implementing New START, but comb through the Complex for savings that can be rolled into programs.  Then, go to the  appropriators with that sum, declare that it’s only for modernization, and to get us back on track (with 2010 projected numbers), by agreeing to await the outcome of the modernization campaign before agreeing any additional reductions or making any unilateral force changes.  If Congress balks on that, then we might well be able to place blame where it belongs for modernization failure.

You’re either part of the problem, part of the solution or part of the scenery in life.

As things stand, the President ought to do more to talk about these issues with the Congress, rather than an adoring international public.  He’s got his Nobel.  Now he needs to demonstrate he can govern.

The FY14 process (and FYDP and FYNSP) is the make-or-break year for holding together arms control and modernization.   Funny thing:  Lots of folks don’t like either idea.  Good luck living in that world.

* * *

DigitalGlobe announced today that it is acquiring Tomnod, a five-guy operation known for its pioneering work in the field of crowdsourced intelligence.  By combining satellite imagery and Tomnod’s own unique crowdsourcing algorithms, this group has done some remarkable work in areas as varied as hunting for the tomb of Genghis Khan, to searching for lost hikers in Peru, to tracking the conflict in Damascus.

DigitalGlobe and Tomnod have already worked together in the past, such as Tomnod contributing layers of crowd-derived insight to Digital Globe’s First Look, an online service for emergency management that provides quicker access to imagery of world disasters.  DigitalGlobe’s new acquisition of Tomnod will now result in a more sustained partnership, with Tomnod’s information being increasingly used as a data source for DigitalGlobe’s in-house analytics teams.

Here in the arms control world, the search continues (largely thanks to Rose Gottemoeller) for potential new ways to harness the information beast that is “the crowd” (e.g. tweets, photos, blog posts, media, etc.) and use it to support arm control verification efforts.  Though they haven’t engaged in this area, I think Tomnod has come up with some interesting solutions to challenges similar to those faced when considering possibilities for the role of public verification in arms control.  As some food for thought, here are a few such concerns along with Tomnod’s way of tackling similar problems:

Concern: Incentivizing people to participate in “public verification challenges” would be difficult without financial incentive (which would be too costly to sustain for a long period of time).

Tomnod’s workaround:  Make it fun. With Tomnod’s crowdsourcing endeavor to locate the lost tomb of Genghis Khan in Mongolia, they have managed to attract over 43,000 “online explorers” as volunteers which have in turn processed over 900,000 images.  How did Tomnod amass such a following of free labor?  By making the image tagging process into a learning experience that aims to feel more like a game than work.  So did they find it, you ask?  Not yet apparently, but they have reportedly made a host of other new discoveries.

Concern: Calling on the public to become whistleblowers might inadvertently put private citizens in harm’s way.

Tomnod’s workaround: Create a secure, password-protected environment where users can contribute information. Given the sensitivity of the Syrian crisis, when Tomnod worked to monitor the crisis in Damascus, it employed a “community sourcing” approach with a password-protected site sent to invite-only groups. Volunteers in the community could then sift through the images to tag things like landmarks, a crowd, or military buildings.  This reportedly resulted in a stream of intelligence tips about hotspots in Damascus, delivered in real-time to administrators and analysts via web browsers and mobile devices.

Concern: How to filter out the users who enjoy tweeting false alarms of an incoming North Korean missile attack from those who may have actually sighted something useful.

Tomnod’s workaround: A fancy algorithm.  Tomnod has developed a proprietary algorithm known as CrowdRank™ that helps sift out reliable users and reliable information from the rest of the mess.  Read more about it here.

Developing potential crowdsourcing mechanisms for arms control verification presents some unique challenges that won’t be easily resolved, but as we move forward in our thinking, it’s good to remember that crowdsourcing as a field in itself has been around for a long time and that it is well-developed in other areas and applications. I think there’s a great deal we can learn from companies like Tomnod that have taken crowdsourcing to new levels through integrating the power of the crowd with the advances of satellite imagery and remote sensing.

After all, could there really be that much difference in appearance between a camouflaged warhead storage site and Khan’s hidden grave?  The search goals may differ, but there’s much room for overlap in the mechanisms for achieving them.

During a panel at today’s Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Acting U/S for Arms Control and International Security Gottemoeller flatly stated “We are not modernizing.”  She may have meant warheads, or something else, but it was succinct.  And damaging.  It’s damaging because it needs urgent clarification–if this budget cycle shows further degradation of the modernization commitments made in 2010, it will kill arms control.

Having played a bit part in the work that lead to the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent to the New START Treaty, I think it would have been nice to know where we are now, then.  Particularly given what we were told in 2010.

The seven major laboratories and production plants, plus the Nevada Test Site, must be able maintain a responsive, sustainable capability to support modernization and sustainment of our nuclear warheads in the absence of nuclear testing.  Likewise, we must maintain credible and effective warhead delivery capability for the warheads the weapons complex sustains.

In 2008, citing concerns from the directors of our national laboratories, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, and the Commander of Strategic Command, Kevin Chilton, stated in a letter to the then-Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that “The United States is the only nuclear weapons state not currently modernizing its nuclear capabilities and supporting infrastructure.”

 They made that statement in 2008, following several years of contentious, political and rarely useful debate over funding our nuclear weapons complex.  Starting in 2009, this tide began to change.  The credit goes first to the bipartisan Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, chaired by former Defense Secretaries Schlesinger and Perry, which noted in its final report that

So long as modernization proceeds within the  framework of existing U.S. policy, it should encounter minimum political difficulty.

Then, in a speech in September 2009, Secretary Gates made clear his views on how modernization should proceed, and its explicit linkage with arms control.  He stated we needed to increase our investments in our national nuclear labs and that we did not seek new capabilities but rather a credible way forward on existing weapons.  He summarized the critical link between modernization and the New START Treaty:

 I also believe that these capabilities are enablers of arms control and our ability to reduce the size of our  nuclear stockpile.  When we have more confidence in the long-term viability of our weapons systems, then our       ability to reduce the number of weapons we must keep in the stockpile is enhanced.  So I see this modernization  effort, if you will, as a vehicle and an enabler of arms  control and stockpile reduction.

Republicans were/are assured of $85 billion over the next 10 years for the Complex, and for delivery vehicles, $100 billion over the next decade.  Lifetime extensions for our warheads were funded and plans were on the table for modernization of delivery vehicles.

In the cover letter to the April 2010 NPR, Secretary Gates stated that, with regard to planning, programming and budgeting for the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex,

These investments, and the NPR’s strategy for warhead life extension, represent a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the nuclear      infrastructure and support our Nation’s deterrent. They will also enable further arms reductions by allowing us to hedge against future threats without the need for a large non-deployed stockpile.

The Directors of the Los Alamos, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories wrote in 2010 that:

[W]e believe that the proposed budgets provide adequate support to sustain the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of America’s nuclear deterrent within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads established by the New START Treaty with adequate confidence and acceptable risk.

They also said that the plan as laid out:

clearly responds to many of the concerns that we and others have voiced in the past about potential future- year funding shortfalls, and it substantially reduces  risks to the overall program.

Now, we understand that plans are on the table to rid ourselves of almost all of these commitments.

We are now come to the critical years.  With problems in each leg of the American Triad, an un-self-effacing Prague agenda in the Oval Office, and modernizing nuclear powers the world over, our extended and basic deterrent is threatened.  At present rates, and given the failures of the B-61 Lifetime Extension Program, we are approaching a deterrent cliff:  Most delivery systems now in the force will face maximum operating lives within the next two decades—and they will take decades to replace.

Maybe someone should ask Gottemoeller to clarify her remark, and maybe we should read the budget more carefully than ever before.