This supposed CIA interference begs the question, why did the CIA not intervene to prevent the 1983 trial and conviction? Preventing a retrial in 1986 would largely have been meaningless since the chance of Khan returning to the Netherlands was zero and it would have no effect on his ability to sell technology later.

The CIA is always a popular scapegoat when leaders, both foreign and domestic, made a decision that looks bad in hindsight. I’m still looking for a full transcript of the radio interview, but it seems likely the PM was asked why he didn’t go ahead with the retrial. This whole episode smacks of pure political CYA after the fact by Lubbers.

Mark,

“If this desire to maintain a “flow of intelligence” resulted in Khan passing nuclear secret to others then one has to wonder…” One has to wonder what? Why the innuendo? What you and Hass seem to suggest (please correct me if I’m wrong), without coming out and directly saying it, is that the CIA knew and was complicit in Khan’s proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea and Libya. Although I would certainly agree that the Pakistani program was largely given a pass in the 1980’s (mainly to ensure Pakistani support to our anti-Soviet Afghan operations), it’s a stretch at best to say the CIA would allow the transfer of nuclear technology to our three primary adversaries (apart from the USSR) during the 1980s. Libya and Iran were quite busy murdering Americans (include CIA agents) all over Europe and the Mediterranean and North Korea was approaching the zenith of its military power.

The CIA reportedly asked the Dutch not to prosecute back in 1975 – I’m not sure how that applies today since Khan did not start selling secrets until the late 1980’s.

The CIA most likely did not want him arrested because they were closely monitoring him and his activities. Arrest would have undoubtedly disrupted the flow of intelligence they were getting. In fact, that intelligence was probably used as evidence to cut off aid to Pakistan in 1979 because of their nuclear program.

20/20 hindsight, as they say.

CIA told Dutch not to prosecute Pakistani nuclearscientist Khan, former [Dutch] premier says – ByASSOCIATED PRESS August 9, 2005

and

Dutch court loses Abdul Qadeer Khan’s files, judgesuspects CIA Sat Sep 10, 2005 7:37 AM ET

The most important considerations are, in my view, regime intent and priority. All other factors are subordinate. Unfortunately, those primary considerations are the ones we know the least about.

This is just nonsensical. Enrichment is an engineering challenge, not a scientific one. There is no point at which you know “the secret” to enrichment; there’s just a lot of hard work. You can be better (i.e. faster or purer) at it, or worse at it. You can be contaminated with lots of molybdenum gunking up your machines and slowing you down, or you can figure that out and go faster. But for the most part there aren’t really “magic threshholds”. Just more experience or less, better craft or worse.

You need good engineers and scientists to do the enrichment, but not great ones. Any nation the size of Iran has good technical people in plentiful supply.

Doubtless we’ll soon hear how we must strike before the moment when Iranians learn the binding energies of the nucleons…

Four years later, the world was again put on notice,this time by Iraq, that Tehran was at the nuclearthreshold, and in 1992 the CIA foresaw atomic arms inIranian hands by 2000. Then U.S. officials pushed thatback to 2003. And in 1997 the Israelis confidentlypredicted a new date: 2005….”

SOURCE: AP February 27, 2006 – Ever a ‘threat,’ never an atomic power…”