But I’ve never had a security clearance, so there may be some really cool stuff I don’t know about…

Second, regardless of which Article(s) of the NPT may be relevant to Clinton’s comments, if the U.S. is genuinely interested in observing (and preserving) the NPT, it should start with Article VI.

And that’s why all of this is foolishness. If they are only for deterrent/counterstrike purposes and the Pakistanis really were willing to surrender any power over the weapons to a foreign state (read: NEVER IN HELL) then why not simply destroy them and agree to retaliate on their behalf?

As a legal matter, the NPT makes no distinction between states party and non-states party. Article IX says simply that “For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.” Pakistan is a non-nuclear weapon State under the NPT.

On Article I, the right clause is the one I quoted. The main legal issue presented by helping Pakistan secure its nukes is whether such activities (to paraphrase) in any way assist Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. A really strict, formalistic reading of the NPT might prohibit any security assistance, insofar as it assists Pakistan’s nuclear program. I draw the line at assistance that makes Pakistan’s weapons more deployable, which would preclude PALs and related technologies or assistance. The devil is in the details of the cooperation, but Senator Clinton’s proposal to “share” security responsibilities with the Pakistani government, as opposed to “assist,” sounds far more ambitious to me then simply helping them secure their physical facilities.

As for the clause you cite mentioning “control,” that is actually a reference to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. It reflects a 1967 compromise between the two superpowers, whereby the United States and NATO dropped its ambitious plans for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) and the Soviet Union ended its opposition to existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO, such as the stationing of nuclear weapons under American command and control on the soil of otherwise non-nuclear NATO allies.

2) Incidentally, on the legal dimension:

a) I’m not sure that it is correct to refer to Pakistan as a “de jure non nuclear weapon State under the NPT”. Only nuclear weapon States are defined by the NPT.

b) The Article 1 operative sentence that renders illegal some forms of assistance to a country like Pakistan is perhaps not be the one quoted by Andy G. but rather the previous one (“undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever… control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly”).

3) Finally, could everyone please relax and take a deep breath? Nuclear security in Pakistan may be better than in the US Air Force. And despite its troubles, the country is not “fragmenting” contrary to what J. is suggesting.