“But the manifesto’s Cold War-like emphasis on nuclear weapons is what will grab the headlines and could prejudice the rest of the report, which has plenty of food for thought.”

I was also struck by the level of attention given to this issue, and had the same sentiment that it was too Cold-War’esque.

While the reader commentary has suggested that nuclear weapons would be used against a Muslim state or terrorist group, I doubt that was the intention of the report’s authors… instead, I suspect they want to maintain a nuclear deterrent for larger potential enemies of NATO who themselves have large nuclear arsenals, namely China and Russia.

I was surprised the Guardian focused on the nuclear weapons aspect of the report when there were so many other critical issues discussed. As a little shameless self promotion, I addressed some of the non-nuclear issues here:

http://atlanticreview.org/archives/978-Military-Leaders-Outline-Plan-for-New-Transatlantic-Bargain.html

Their primary expertise, it is fair to say, would not be in arms control or deterrence.

See:
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2008/01/certainty-on-th.html#more

In other words, to commit terrorism, and to dress it up as “pre-emptive” in the absence of any actual imminent threat.

Imagine if the Iranians had espoused your theory – would you stand for it then? Because what’s good for the goose is good for the gander.

All weapons which we have, and which countries we currently like possess, are “defensive”

It is a fact, not a theory, that a breach of the UN Charter can only be verified by the Security Council. So as long as the permanent members are willing to use their veto power, they are immune from censure, since they can interpret the Charter as loosely as they desire.

Dear Alex W,

The generals are not proposing to threaten a first strike, but to employ one if all other forms of persuasion fail. The idea is to cause an overwhelming psychological shock, which would then permit other proliferators to be deterred through conventional methods.

I really see this policy in a similar vein – the idea being to deter development and especially use of unconventional weapons through the threat of nuclear response.

So, ISTM there are two questions:

1. Is such an implied threat likely to be seen as credible, a necessary factor to achieve a deterrent effect? Personally, I don’t think so.

2. In what situations would such a policy actually be carried out? I can think of very few situations where a nuclear strike would achieve results that a conventional strike could not. In rare situations where a nuclear response might be the only preventative option, an explicit threat to respond with nukes might have a deterrent effect.

So while I don’t agree with this policy, I don’t quite understand all the hullabaloo as evidenced by some commenters discussing the policy in legal terms as if it already happened or was imminent. Even if this policy is ultimately adopted, it is unlikely, at best, to ever be used.

We come to ACW, presumably, to read expert opinion from actual professionals. This sort of miscellaneous commentary from internet-folk dilutes the value of the forum and should be reconsidered.

Thanks.

Definitely worse than MAD. This is threatening to shoot first in order to deter first shooting. MAD at least seemed feasible, if horrible and problematic.

I’m a bit baffled at how it would be decided upon when it would be a good idea to first strike anyway. Striking second, sure, everybody would pretty much agree when to do that—the timing would be dictated by the first strike. But striking first, before the first? When is it a good time to do that? Would you ever be able to get three conscionable professionals to agree on such a thing, that today is better than tomorrow?

I do think that these uncorroborated lists can be very dangerous, particularly when they lump nuclear, chemical and biological together as “WMD” or when they confuse “capabilities” and “weapons”.

Let’s deal with known facts. There are five remaining declared possessors of chemical weapons under the CWC (a sixth, Albania, completed destruction of its stockpile last July) – India, Libya, Russia, South Korea and the US. An additional 7 states have declared former CW programmes – Bosnia, China, France, Iran, Japan, Serbia and the UK. Declared CW facilities in all these states have been closed down and, along with the weapons, are under international monitoring by the OPCW. So, spacemanafrica, some of your 17 did indeed have CW programmes, but these are historical and have been deactivated. By no means can they be described as “active”. All this information and much more can be found on the OPCW’s website.

I am fully aware of the distinction between offensive and defensive programmes but what I am not clear about with respect to the CSIS manifesto is what they mean by “capability”. Almost every industrialised country could be described as having a CW “capability” but this is very different to having stockpiled munitions and military doctrine for use.

The term “offensive biological weapon” still strikes me as very strange. Of course, countries have defensive BW programmes (i.e. prophylactics, protection etc). But I don’t understand why the manifesto talks about “offensive” biological weapons, why is the qualification needed? By definition a biological weapon is offensive. Or is there perhaps an implication that BW held by some countries are “offensive” whereas BW held by others might be “defensive”?

And don’t even get me started on the “Eurabia” rubbish. I think FOARP said it well.