Bonjour, mes amis.

Somewhat delayed, the French White Paper on defence has been published this morning.

Note the English version is “simplified”. The original is much longer and beyond my schoolboy French. If any ACW reader would like to read the original and highlight key differences I will award them the Order of the Wonk (First Class).

Much of the reporting in the UK this morning has focused on two aspects of the Paper. First, there is the call for a “new rapprochement with the command structure of NATO.” Second, the Paper advocates a greater role for the European Union in terms of defence.

The first thing that stuck (and amused) me when I downloaded the Paper myself was the presence of hand-drawn additions to a number of pictures (see above). Actually, that picture really is incomprehensible, even if viewed in context. Why, for heaven’s sake, is South-West Ireland circled? (Is France planning some kind of revenge for the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, perhaps?)

But seriously…

The Paper as a whole is going to take some time to digest and I won’t try to give much in the way of analysis today; I’ll just highlight some of the key points that might interest Wonk readers.

There is one general comment I do want to make though. For a while now, French officials have been saying that this will be more than just a Paper on defence. It will take a holistic look at security. Indeed, the White Paper describes its purpose thus:

The major innovation compared to the previous White paper is that the security
interests are appraised globally without restricting the analysis to defence issues.
A national security strategy is defined in order to provide responses to “all the
risks and threats which could endanger the life of the Nation.”

I’m not sure how far this is borne out in practice. Health threats and environmental threats, for instance, are mentioned but their analysis is somewhat cursory and much of the meat of the Paper focuses on ‘classic’ defence issues (maybe the French original deals with these issues more fully?) That said, there are some interesting ideas about crisis communication with the public (using text messaging for instance).

On the nuclear side, not much new is said frankly. France’s new-found willingness to talk about nuclear disarmament has been confirmed (indeed, nuclear disarmament even has an entire box dedicated to it).

That said, the presentation of and language in the report somewhat undermines the disarmament section. For instance, I think it is unhelpful that one of the five key “take-home” points on the French embassy in London’s website is

As a core component of national security, France’s nuclear deterrent capability is to be strengthened.

As a more substantive example, consider the following description of French nuclear doctrine:

Nuclear deterrence remains an essential concept of national security. It is the ultimate guarantee of the security and independence of France. The sole purpose of the nuclear deterrent is to prevent any State-originating aggression against the vital interests of the nation wherever it may come from and in whatever shape or form. Given the diversity of situations to which France might be confronted in an age of globalisation, the credibility of the deterrent is based on the ability to provide the President , with an autonomous and sufficiently wide and diversified range of assets and options….

Again, talking about a “wide and diversified range of assets” (even if it is preceded by the word “sufficiently”) detracts from the concept of minimum deterrence (or strict sufficiency as it is called in France). Nuclear weapon states have a hard task balancing national security with article VI—but surely they can do it less clumsily than this?

The above statement also raises other issues. Notably, what does “prevent” mean? Does it mean deter or coerce? The Cherbourg speech talked about using a nuclear weapon to signal French resolve (i.e. coercion). The language here is more vague.

In terms of practical steps, France has announced the following:

  • the nuclear ballistic submarine fleet will be equipped from 2010 onwards with the
    M51 intercontinental ballistic missile, deployed on our new-generation SSBNs;
  • the airborne component will be equipped from 2009 onwards with the ASMP A
    cruise missile, deployed on Mirage 2000 NK3 and Rafale aircraft, stationed in
    France and carrier-based. The number of nuclear-capable land-based aircraft will
    be reduced from 60 to 40;
  • the simulation programme, based notably on the corresponding facilities in the
    field of lasers (LMJ), X-ray analysis and supercalculators will ensure the reliability
    of our nuclear warheads;
  • the preservation of our national missile and submarine competencies, and the
    improvement on a 2025 horizon, of the range and accuracy of our missiles;
  • the overall modernisation of the support environment for our nuclear capabilities,
    notably in terms of communications.

Space and cyber threats are also highlighted in the Paper. France places a great emphasis on ballistic missile threats, announcing that “a ballistic missile detection and early-warning capability will be in place by 2020, preceded by an interim satellite system during the coming decade.”

In terms of cyber threats it says this:

Cyber-war is a major concern for which the White Paper develops a two-prong strategy: on the one hand, a new concept of cyber-defence, organised in depth and coordinated by a new Security of Information Systems Agency under the purview of the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN); on the other hand, the establishment of an offensive cyber-war capability, part of which will come under the Joint Staff and the other part will be developed within specialised services.

This statement surprised me a lot. I’m not in the least surprised that France is developing an offensive cyber-war capability; I am shocked it is being so transparent about it. But, then again, maybe that’s just my excruciatingly British cynicism.