There was an interesting story in the Guardian on Friday about the future of British nuclear warheads.
When the decision to replace the Vanguard submarines was taken last year, the government announced that it had not yet made any decision about the future of the warheads (i.e. whether they would have their lives extended or be replaced). However, according to a ‘speaking note’ used by a government official at a defence industry conference that has just been released under the Freedom of Information Act
…the intention is to replace the entire Vanguard class submarine system. Including the warhead and missile.
The Ministry of Defence have reiterated their line that no decision has yet been taken.
To be fair, I think it is entirely plausible that the British official did not accurately represent government policy and that no decision has yet been made. It’s also entirely plausible that the government has already secretly decided to replace the warheads but can’t say so until it consults parliament.
We may never know the truth. As far as I understand it, some modification of the current warhead design will be required because some non-nuclear components, which are no longer being manufactured, are reaching the end of their design lives. However, if the UK does build a new warhead I strongly suspect it will be called a ‘modification’ of the old design. (I mean, they both contain plutonium and high explosives, right?)
This raises the following question: If the UK government says that it is only modifying the old design, how do we know whether that is really the case?
A British JASON equivalent would be invaluable here.
Major Lemon | July 29, 2008
British warheads? Yeah. Old scenarios have fallen by the wayside. The Soviet threat is no more and the Trident second strike capability has outgrown its original purpose. Even if the UK were to retain a tactical or even intermediate range nuclear force for a war fighting capability, no one would give a damn (least of all the Iranians) as Britain (under Blair and Brown – true British ****heads) has become a spent force in international politics. Sad but bloody true. NATO aside, the only people standing up for the free world these days is the USA. Lets hope it stays Republican.
FSB | July 29, 2008
My sketchy recollection is that the US RRW and UK RRW are deeply meshed — US and UK officers at each other’s facilities etc.
I think either both US and UK RRW will go ahead or neither will. I welcome anyone to correct me if they have better info.
Ael | July 29, 2008
.. and people wonder why the NPT regime is breaking down.
The deal was supposed to be: those without the bomb won’t build em and those with the bomb will get rid of theirs.
(which actually favours the larger powers, cause nobody would take North Korea very seriously unless they had the bomb)
It is now clear that those with the bomb are keeping theirs and if you want to be taken seriously, you need to have a bomb too! (or at least build one in short order).
Lao Tao Ren | July 29, 2008
“some non-nuclear components, which are no longer being manufactured, are reaching the end of their design lives”
Sounds like electronic components, the DMSS problem with a UK flavor.
You mean to tell us that the UK blokes didn’t stockpile enough spare components when they first spec. out the system?
Tsk… tsk… tsk…
Magoo Nair | July 29, 2008
Production of Nuclear warheads is no different than that of – let us say cars. Each part has to be tested for efficacy before it can be added to a sub-assembly and thereafter the subassembly has to be tested to ensure that the sum of the parts produce the result as laid down in the qualitative requirement (QR). This includes technological and physical tests. The same process follows when sub-assemblies are put together as a whole car. Once the car is certified by the scientists and technicians and is ready for production, the car has to be physically tested to meet the QR standards including mandatory safety levels before the authorities can approve it for use on public roads. That car has a life span based on the life span of each part that plays a part in the functioning of the car. Some may be replaceable without the complete rigours of testing while others need to be redesigned. Therefore, after its recognised life span the authorities will no longer certify it fit for use on public roads. When it comes to nuclear weapons the margin of safety required of each part and sub assembly is substantially reduced. Nuclear weapons cannot be modified and passed fit for use without rigorous testing. It amounts to producing a new weapon system. The US RRW and British nuclear warhead plans are a pile of semantics. Pure bullshit in violation of Article VI of the NPT, which does not seem to apply to these states. Besides the damage the war head produces on the target, it is vulnerable to thousands of variables from storage to firing and in flight. The capacity of dealing with these variables cannot be left to laboratory testing. Someone is bluffing
FSB | July 29, 2008
And anyway, the weakest link in the weapons delivery ssytem is the ICBM.
Want more reliable weapons? Forget about replacing the warhead — design a new more reliable ICBM.
Robert Kelly | July 29, 2008
“Want more reliable weapons? Forget about replacing the warhead — design a new more reliable ICBM.”
This will not prevent the WH from being a weaklink or becoming the weakest link.
A newly designed ICBM does nothing for the safety/security & reliability issues related to the WH. Safety/security issues begin long before the WH being mated with the delivery system.
“If the UK government says that it is only modifying the old design, how do we know whether that is really the case?”
If major modifications are made to the physics package, you can be fairly sure it’s a new WH :)
elizzar | July 29, 2008
from what i have read i believe any alterations to the British warhead would be very much along the lines of the American rrw program, as someone else has commented. basically it is to make sure the warhead has a lifespan equivalent to that of the new submarines/missiles (delivery system), with current warheads only certified until the end of the trident lifespan. considering the recent (quiet-ish) £3 billion + investment in AWE (atomic weapons establishment) in the UK, both equipment and personnel, for research into new warheads / simulation of explosion as real tests are banned, it seems the uk has been quietly researching this topic for quite a while. other improvements in the system may allow for more rapid re-targeting of the missiles for non-state targets, and improvements to accuracy. as for ‘major lemon’, the UK nuclear capability is a mirv-based strategic one – using the same kind of submarine delivery system as the USA ballistic one, so i don’t quite understand your comment. it remains official policy to be used only as a retaliation strike (ie: mad-type scenario), but that does not mean the system cannot be used as first strike technological wise. i don’t see anyone else actually threatening to nuke Iran either, including the USA (though perhaps McCain might soon to get some more of those red-neck votes), which of course remains the only country to ever use these terrible weapons in war. also, officially, the UK has withdrawn its nuclear tactical weapons (artillery, mines, low yield warheads etc.) the only one of the five permanent UN security council members, as well as air launched strategic weapons. so yes, it isn’t great that the uk is thinking of renewing their warheads, but they have still reduced their stockpile to what is considered the lowest level for successful deterrent, as opposed to the current/future-planned US and Russian arsenals.
B. Walthrop | July 30, 2008
As FSB says, the US and UK sea based strategic deterrent seem to be tightly meshed. Not sure about the warheads, but isn’t the Trident D-5 going through some service life extension? I would assume the UK sub would be built around the new launch vehicle for both US and UK physics packages. UK subs are in need of replacement before the Ohio class. The UK subs may be somewhat of a tell on any future US sea based program. Thoughts from the experts would be interesting.
Magoo Nair | July 30, 2008
True ‘officially, the UK has withdrawn its nuclear tactical weapons. The trick here is that Whitehall renamed these as sub-strategic weapons designed to be fired from submarine or airborne cruise missiles. It sounds like any terrorist group that is sanctioned reappearing under a new ‘nom de plume’ and then business as usual. The so called doing away with ‘tactical nuclear weapons’ was a ploy to facilitate the negotiations for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Please note – at that time the nuclear weapon states gave assurances that nukes would not been used against non-nuclear weapon states. What happened? Soon after getting the indefinite extension the US and France have adopted the ‘preemptive strategy’ including nukes on any target which harbour terrorists!!! Britain has not announced such a policy yet but that could be a pardonable omission.
FSB | July 30, 2008
Robert Kelly:
the weakest link is the weakest link, OK?
& the weakest link is the reliability of the ICBM, NOT the warhead.
The reliability of the warheads is 97-99%.
Empirically.
Give it a rest.
Robert Kelly | July 30, 2008
— FSB · Jul 30, 12:59 AM ·
My mistake. I thought the subject being discussed was “Warheads” ;)
Rwendland | July 30, 2008
A clue to telling if a complete weapon replacement is taking place might be to discover how much of the UK expenditure is incurred in the U.S.
A UK NAO report noted that for the current UK Trident most of the UK warhead development and production expenditure was incurred in the U.S., including the U.S. supply of “certain warhead-related components”.
If there is a complete weapon replacement we might expect to see similar levels of expenditure in the U.S., less so probably if it is just a modification. Though possibly the recent large expenditure at the AWE means less of the work needs to be done by the U.S.
The NAO report is: (29 June 1987) Ministry of Defence and Property Services Agency: Control and Management of the Trident Programme. National Audit Office, para. 1.1, 3.27, A4.4. ISBN 0102027889 – not online.
BTW I have never seen any comment on the fact that A4.4 of the NAO report implies that some if not most of the “special materials” in the UK Trident warhead was supplied by the U.S. A4.4 says consideration was given to buying all the “special materials” from the U.S. on cost grounds, but in 1982 Ministers decided a “substantial proportion should be purchased in the UK”, implying the rest was supplied by the U.S. The NPT does not ban this between NWSs, but it seems to be pushing the spirit of Article 1 – how many “warhead-related components” and how much “special material” amounts to an Article 1 “nuclear weapon”? It will be interesting to read the 1982 discussion papers when they are made public.
Hope is Not A Foreign Policy | July 31, 2008
Glad to see that the U.K. is taking modernization seriously. It’s a good policy move on London’s part.
FSB | July 31, 2008
Warheads are something that are really not designed to be used — they are designed to function as a deterrent.
Even if they are just 97% reliable (worst case), they still serve their deterrent purposes. No one who has a 97% assured warhead aimed at them will behave any differently from one who has a 99.99% assured warhead aimed at them.
In any case, UK and US targeting practices always put a few ICBMs on each target for good measure obviating any reliability argument.
The whole RRW program is a crock of sh*t, to employ the weapons personnel.
Lao Tao Ren | July 31, 2008
@FSB
I am not qualified to talk about the many different aspects of the RRW program with the exception of certain narrow slices concerning electronics.
Since the warheads in inventory were designed, there have been huge leaps in advances for electronics.
In this area alone, it is self evident that a modernized electronics package will directly impact on the reliability and safety of the system in terms of the functionality of the Permissible Action Links, and also in some of the electronic components in the safety / firing mechanism (much of which haven’t changed).
If that were the only benefits, I would say it is enough to warrant a “go ahead” for the program.
True, the program will probably yield much more benefits, from using fire retardant explosives which are safer to lowering maintenance needs, to probably making bigger and better warheads.
True, it has the effect of keeping a bunch of nuclear scientists employed.
And what’s wrong with that?
Do we really want a bunch of people like that wandering the world with nothing better to do, perhaps as “consultants”?
On balance, a more reliable (and powerful) arsenal will give the US more confidence to build down to a smaller arsenal.
There is also a need to have a new generation of scientists, engineers, and technicians trained as the skills needed to really understand the old stuff gradually erode away with retirements and old age.
So on balance, the RRW program is not a bad thing.
If we are going to have nuclear arsenals, what is wrong with building them with the best knowhow possible?
R.Kelly | July 31, 2008
— Lao Tao Ren • Jul 31, 06:40 AM •
Well stated.
To iterate and clarify a bit on your excellent points, I prefer to think in terms of “Weapons Surety” (of which Reliability is one of the four legs/functions of Weapons Surety).
Weapons Surety includes:
*Reliability (for both the Weapon Delivery System and the Warhead)
*Safety
*Security
*Control of Nuclear Weapons
As you’ve noted, the use of IHE in a RRW would provide significant improvement to both the Safety and Security of the Warhead
Dan | July 31, 2008
FSB,
The ICBM being labeled the weakest link is kind of goofy. The D-5 has been successful beyond anybody’s dreams from both a reliability and accuracy standpoint…
FSB | August 1, 2008
Dan,
sure, but hardly 98% reliable, as are the warheads. Even space launch vehicles are not that reliable and they are much more carefully monitored than the ICBMs.
My contention is that RRW is a waste of $, and absent a review of the US nuclear posture in general, should not go ahead.
I don’t agree that a huge expenditure in making new warheads is justified only to keep weaponeers employed.
Else, at the least, be frickin’ honest & say that is the justification.
Stop wasting my $. The US deterrent is fine without RRW.
Alex | August 1, 2008
<em>True ‘officially, the UK has withdrawn its nuclear tactical weapons. The trick here is that Whitehall renamed these as sub-strategic weapons designed to be fired from submarine or airborne cruise missiles.</em>
Wrong. The RAF’s WE177 laydown nukes were withdrawn and destroyed in 1997; I think the Lance missiles went well before that.
Carey Sublette | August 1, 2008
FSB said:
Dan, sure, but hardly 98% reliable, as are the warheads.
The Trident D5 has had 120 consecutive successful launches since the conclusion of the test program in 1989. This puts its reliability at better than 99.2%. For the Minuteman III, hundreds of test launches have occurred since its deployment in the 1970s and with a bit of Googling have not been able to uncover any test failures since its deployment.
Even space launch vehicles are not that reliable and they are much more carefully monitored than the ICBMs.
Indeed space launch vehicles in general are not quite that reliable, though they come close, but your apparent belief that they should be more reliable than ICBMs is unfounded. Space launch vehicles are modified more often than ICBMs, and are generally based on more complex liquid fuel technology for performance reasons. Even so, after a “teething” period where some failures occur even space launch vehicles typically rack up an unbroken successful launch record, which can exceed 100 launches for vehicles that remain in use for many years.
The Ariane 4 had an overall success rate of better than 97%, but in the last 9 years of use had no failures at all.
Generally speaking, a proven standardized launcher or missile design can expect to have reliabilities of 99% or better.
FSB | August 1, 2008
Carey,
test launches are different from real-world scenario blind launches, and I would argue that if test launches are getting 99% success rate then real-world blind launches without prior awareness of the launch will be a bit less.
Further, just getting the ICBM to fire is different from it hitting its target with high-accuracy (few tenths of a km). Many things in the ICBM can and do go wrong, including nav/elec. failures even though it may fly more or less OK.
Also, the warheads are similarly reliable ~98%m (in blind tests of the stockpile stewardship process), therefore there is no strong argument that the warheads are the weakness in reliability.
Furthermore the D5’s are not the only types of ICBMs. Others have worse reliability and CEPs.
And, most importantly, there is no assurance whatsoever that new warheads — made without testing — will be any more reliable than ~99% reliable current ones anyway.
Ultimately we do not need to quibble: ~99% reliable warheads mated to ~99% reliable ICBMs provide an adequate deterrent — there is no need for the USG to spend my $$$$$$$ for RRW.
An enemy who is seeing the possibility of being attacked by a 99% reliable warhead riding on a 99% reliable ICBM will be deterred as well as one who is seeing a 99.5% (but more likely the same or even worse than now due to no testing of RRW) reliable warhead on a 99% reliable ICBM.
Let’s please not lose focus of the deterrent forest while writing wonkish comments about the ICBM trees.
John Ainslie | August 4, 2008
I have put the redacted and revised versions of the statements behind this story on the SCND website:
http://banthebomb.org/blog/article.php?aid=1101&cid=3
Carey Sublette | August 4, 2008
test launches are different from real-world scenario blind launches, and I would argue that if test launches are getting 99% success rate then real-world blind launches without prior awareness of the launch will be a bit less.
No, they are actually getting 100% success after going into full service (but given that the sample size is not unlimited, you can only place an upper bound on actual success).
Further, just getting the ICBM to fire is different from it hitting its target with high-accuracy (few tenths of a km). Many things in the ICBM can and do go wrong, including nav/elec. failures even though it may fly more or less OK.
Test launches also test out the guidance system, since the RVs hit targets at Kwajalein.
Also, the warheads are similarly reliable ~98%m (in blind tests of the stockpile stewardship process),
Funny that you don’t credit full live system tests as sufficient evidence of reliability of ICBMs, but do accept component and inert firing tests as sufficient evidence for warheads (though how are the latter more blind than the ICBM tests escapes me). I think that both test approaches are quite sufficient for their purposes.
therefore there is no strong argument that the warheads are the weakness in reliability.
True enough, but I never made such an argument. I was simply disputing your apparent contention that there was a strong argument in the reverse direction.
Furthermore the D5’s are not the only types of ICBMs. Others have worse reliability and CEPs.
The only other long range ballistic missile in the U.S. arsenal is the Minute Man III (there is none in the UK), which has no worse reliability (in fact given its longer test record, the bound on reliability is actually better). Is a 90 m CEP really significantly better in any practical sense to a 120 m CEP?
Ultimately we do not need to quibble: ~99% reliable warheads mated to ~99% reliable ICBMs provide an adequate deterrent — there is no need for the USG to spend my $$$$$$$ for RRW.
Quite so. If this had been the point you originally made I would have had no cause to dispute it. In fact, I think deterrence is unaffected with much lower levels of reliability. The “high 9’s” in reliability is only for the edification of SIOP planners, and given that they are secret the actual targeting plans have no direct effect on deterrence.
Let’s please not lose focus of the deterrent forest while writing wonkish comments about the ICBM trees.
Have you got a better venue for wonkish debates than ArmsControlWonk (:-))?
FSB: If you thought this whole issue was silly and not worth discussing, why did you raise it to begin with?
FSB | August 4, 2008
So they want to replace both the ICBM and the warhead?! idiots.
Probably, any mechanism in the submarine is less reliable than either of those.
And new warhead — without new testing!…..right — will be less of a deterrent to any enemy than the old ones we know and love (and that we know work).
FSB | August 4, 2008
Carey,
agreed — there is no deterrent benefit to making new warheads or ICBMs.
I stand corrected that the ICBM has worse reliability than the current warheads. Within errors, their reliabilities for all practical purposes are identical.
Before making new warheads or ICBMs the entirety of the weapons systems need to be examined
Lao Tao Ren | August 5, 2008
@FSB
“the old [warheads] ones we know and love (and that we know work)”
The older they get, the less sure we are that they will work unless we are to run another round of (not necessarily nuclear) tests to validate old and aged components.
It is quite possible to test a warhead assembly with a simulated pit.
We are talking about mundane parts like wiring, insulation, connectors, wire bonds, packaging, as well as electronic components that are subject to not only corrosion in a warhead, but also the simple ravages of old age.
If you want to question the entire logic or illogic of nuclear weapons, fine —- do so. In the mean time, a fair, reasonable, and honest assessment will be that nuclear weapons will be needed for at least 50 years out absent a breakthrough international consensus to eliminate them.
Suppose a consensus to eliminate nuclear weapons is reached in 10 years, it will still take 20+ years to “build down” the existing arsenal that gives states that have relied on it for security to develop and deploy conventional weapons alternatives, assuming that it is not an abrupt “eliminate everything in 5 years” mandate.
From this perspective, there will be a need for nuclear warheads for at least 20 years.
I would say that is enough to justify the RRW.
One of the considerations if there is (pipe dream) a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, there will still be a need to have a stockpile of parts, components, and pits so if the treaty falls apart, the US can quickly have an arsenal back in business.
The RRW, being made of new components that will have a 30+ year of availability, will actually HELP the US along the path of eliminating nuclear weapons. A stockpile of very old (and with each year, a growing % of dud parts) mean that if the (ready to launch) nuclear arsenal was eliminated, there would be much longer lead times to rebuild a deterrent.
I reiterate —- the surest way to make nuclear weapons unnecessary to US security is knowing that “just in case” they are necessary, the US can have them back in a week, and when the US gets them back, know that they are sure to work because they are not made from old, dilapidated parts with the core expertise and knowhow having been purged from the institutional memory by retirements and old age.
FSB | August 5, 2008
Lao Tao Ren:
“We are talking about mundane parts like wiring, insulation, connectors, wire bonds, packaging, as well as electronic components that are subject to not only corrosion in a warhead, but also the simple ravages of old age.”
Please, if you think replacing electronic is a good idea — great go ahead. No new warhead design is needed for that.
The ravages of old age is an incorrect argument
The current warheads are 97-99% reliable.
I am not sure how to re-state the above statement so that it gets across. Please re-read it.
RRW is a non-solution to a problem that does not exist.
Why is it a non-solution (or even a counter-solution)? Because it will be designed and tested on computers. How are untested warheads more reliable than empirically 97-99% reliable current warheads that have been tested?
If you want to make arguments about retirements and institutional memory being lost as a reason to fund RRW using my tax $$$$$$$$ then please get the people ramming these things down our throat to be honest and admit to that and sell it to congress on that point alone. Do not lie to the American public that the current warheads are unreliable.
(Since when is lying to the American people OK? First we have USA-193 and now RRW!)
My arguments are absolutely not about the “illogic of nuclear weapons”; my argument against RRW is that nuclear weapons are not like cars and planes — they are not something designed to be used. They are about percieved deterrence by your enemy.
And a 97-99% reliable warhead will deter your enemy just fine.
In fact, a tested 97-99% reliable current warhead will be a greater deterrence to your enemy than an untested new warhead.
Lao Tao Ren | August 5, 2008
@FSB
You mean to tell me you do not believe non-nuclear (pit) components (even replacement components from the stockpile) age and deteriorate over time?
If I cannot convince you that mundane things like that age… and with age… comes less reliability… well, I give up.
97% reliable can become 70% or less real fast if a critical component have a fault that comes with age or corrosion.
For a stockpile to be this old, I would think it astute to revalidate the components.
Do we even know the deterioration characteristic of these old components? Is the curve linear? exponential? Sharp fall off past x point?
And what do you do about the fact that some components (in the case of the UK warheads) are no longer manufactured and the stockpile of replacements is dwindling?
Are you saying that the UK should just “go without”? If so, say so.
FSB | August 5, 2008
LTR:
No, all I am saying a new warhead design is not needed, nor would it be any more reliable if untested as is repeatedly asserted by RRW proponents.
You’d like to replace components of the warhead? Sure go ahead, it may be sensible if it is determined to be necessary based more than on just feelings.
Want to know about the he deterioration characteristic of these old components? Open the document under ‘Related Links’ at this URL if you are interested in the technical reasons why RRW is technically infeasible.
All this is quite aside from the fact that, yes, even if by some miracle at some future time the reliability is reduced to 70%, the warhead is an effective deterrent.
Do you know the reliability of the Russian warheads? No. Are you scared sh*tless of them anyway? Yes. Are the Russian scared sh*tless of a 99%,97%,70% effective warhead? Yes.
These are not cars or trucks — you don’t use warheads, ok?
Lastly, no-one can prove that an untested new design will be more than 97-99% effective without testing. It will likely be perceived as being less effective. And almost the only thing that counts here are the perceptions of your adversaries.
You want to swap out some electronics and keep the same design — go ahead if there is really a technical reason to do so. Your “feelings” about this do not amount to such. And swapping out some electronics does not mean a new warhead design is needed.
Carey Sublette | August 5, 2008
Re: Lao Tao Ren
You appear to be talking at cross-purposes with FSB. FSB is objecting to the value of RRW (developing a new warhead) when compared to stockpile stewardship (monitoring and maintaining existing warheads). This is in no way a denial of the existence of deterioration.
Stockpile stewardship monitors the deterioration of all components and replaces them as needed.
The argument is made that this course cannot be maintained – that it becomes impossible to replace components with identical ones, and that identical replacements are the only ones that are acceptable, and thus we cannot maintain the existing warheads. And from this we get a requirement for new warhead designs.
But the case that existing warheads cannot be maintained amounts to a plea that warhead engineering is fundamentally different from all other types of engineering and that unknown or accidental properties of the components are responsible for the weapon’s performance in some mysterious manner.
This is implausible.
All of the components of a nuclear warhead were designed to have certain functional properties that can be specified and measured. Modern warhead designs were successfully proved with only a very limited number of tests, despite their complexity and tendency to push the limits of design space. This indicates that the functional specs of the parts were sufficient to assure the performance of the overall design, although this design no doubt required some adjustment as part of the tests. If mysterious and unpredictable behaviors of the components were a real problem then many, many, many trial-and-error tests would have been required to work them out.
Replacement parts can be made to match these same specs generated in the original design effort. This is supplemented in the stewardship program by careful characterization of the components in existing weapons, documenting their existing properties in the best available components (which thus amount to a second source of specs).
Although manufacturing processes and industrial plants change, technology is not going backward and, I assert, functionally equivalent parts can be made for any part of a bomb. Electronics should be the among the easiest to replace in fact, the desired electronic behavior of any old system should easily be emulated with modern components.
FSB | August 5, 2008
Thanks for clarifying Carey.
Yes, I am all for stockpile stewardship, and replacing any components of the entire weapons systems determined to be defective.
Personally, I would begin by taking off any tracing paper found on UK subs! ;)
I don’t see any technical (or deterrent policy) reason to design new warheads. In fact, I see technical & deterrent policy reasons against designing new warheads that are untested, and, more importantly, that your adversaries know are untested.
Lao Tao Ren | August 5, 2008
“Replacement parts can be made to match these same specs generated in the original design effort.
functionally equivalent parts can be made for any part of a bomb. Electronics should be the among the easiest to replace in fact, the desired electronic behavior of any old system should easily be emulated with modern components.”
These two statements are at the crux of the debate and I am glad you brought the issue up.
Replacements CAN be made to match the specs providing that the part do not require a manufacturing process / facility that have long been shut down and the equipment and expert personnel (not just raw materials) no longer available.
If you are going to substitute modern (or currently available) electronic parts, theoretically that sounds easy, and in fact, it is easy. BUT you would have to validate the sub or system from the beginning.
In order to move this discussion forward, I am afraid that it is necessary to get down to individual part numbers and have the specific story of each part.
That discussion, I am afraid, is not possible with information available to the general public.
However, I can point you to a literature on this issue, termed: “Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS)” and the website dmsmc.org that deals with this problem.
I am afraid that that is as far as I can go on this issue.
FSB | August 6, 2008
LTR,
your points may be (or may not be) valid but they do not necessarily validate designing new warheads, which is what RRW is about.
The exact same old warhead design can be implemented with completely new electronic subsystems, if needed.
Carey is absolutely correct in his assessment.
I am being a stickler on this because RRW is a dangerous and counter-productive idea, and you appear to give it the aura of necessity whereas in reality that is not the case at all.
I have provided you with documentation at the URL in my above post that says that “from 1958-1996 the Stockpile Evaluation Program sampled nearly 14,000 weapons. Of
these, approximately 2.8 percent revealed “actionable findings,” which required some
corrective action (e.g., changes to the warhead itself or to a procedure) to maintain the stated
reliability—or, in some cases, the weapon’s stated reliability was reduced. About 1.3 percent
of the 14,000 weapons were found to have failures that, if not corrected, would prevent the
warhead from operating as intended, within a small fraction of the design yield.”
Lao Tao Ren | August 6, 2008
@FSB
Let’s just agree to disagree.
Fundamentally, I am in favor of the US having the RRW program fully funded.
Yes, I do assume that the RRW can be credibly fielded with no nuclear testing —- a point that you and I will not agree on.
I have very little faith in those macro Stockpile Evaluation Program Reports without looking at it component by component, part number by part number.
Given what I know about the longevity of certain parts (including those in the spares stockpile), I lean toward a brand new design built by, and with young, bright, bushy eyed technicians, engineers, scientists, etc. that have a median age of, say, 30 and will be around for at least 25 more years before they retire.
Call it a personal preference based on a lot of experience with using antiques and having to deal with finding people that knew something about a certain thing…. that have long retired and have to be found, dredged out, and then persuaded to down dump their knowhow.
Not easy to do… take my word for it.
There is a lot of knowhow that is not in the blueprints, documentation, logbooks, etc. that disappears when people retire or die off.
To cite a public example, when Hubble was “fixed” with COSTARS, the optics “guru” they wanted had already retired, he came out of retirement to do this project.
A lot of times, skills and expertise are a lot thinner than we like to admit.
In the area of expertise dealing with US nuclear weapons, renewal of these skills is essential.
The world is a safer place with the US in possession of the best, up-to-date arsenal the US can field.
FSB | August 6, 2008
LTR,
Yes, I agree that we disagree.
You support RRW for non-technical reasons (or at least reasons that have not been quantified in any meaingful way yet), and mostly to keep nuclear weapons knowledge base.
Great, now get RRW supporters to also sell it to the US public (Congress, Senate) on those counts only. Let’s see how far it flies.
Please do not lie to congress that the current warheads are unreliable, and that that is the reason to support RRW. It is not.
The US arsenal is fully reliable (97-99%), and moreso than it will be with an untested RRW.
If anything, in the yes of adversaries an untested warhead is (slightly) less of a deterrent. And that is all that counts — not the real reliability. Again, we are not talking about cars — warheads are not used; their use is in scaring opponents. An untested warhead is (slightly) less scary than a tested one.
So, yes, agreed to disagree.
Lao Tao Ren | August 6, 2008
@FSB
Look at some basic demographics.
If you were around during the Manhattan project, you were probably in you 90s if you are still alive.
If you were 30 in the 60s and 70s (the height of the buildup), you are now 70 or so.
What I am saying —- about the need to have a reasonably age nuclear weapons workforce, applies to Russia, UK, France, China, and every other NWS.
When things get old and the people who really know the stuff are out the door, the human element in reliability that is based on deep, personal knowledge and experience with the systems, goes out the door.
I am not in any way, shape or form involved with selling RRW to the US people or Congress and will in no way benefit (or lose) either way.
But I do get worried when I see more and more evidence of the US losing critical skills in many areas, like systems engineering, nuclear technology, etc.
Do you know how hard it is to attract a good engineer into these older fields when you have to compete with the likes of Google?
FSB | August 6, 2008
LTR,
I fully appreciate your viewpoint. But, unfortunately, it is not the only reason RRW proponents offer when selling RRW to congress — that is my problem with RRW proponents (not including yourself).
If congress and senate agree with you that the US public ought to indugle in welfare support to the national labs, then they should perhaps consider a small side project like a $10m prize for the best new warhead — we don’t really need to harm our actual deterrent by actually replacing known, trusted warheads with untested ones. IMHO.
Every 3 years they could have a new prize for best new design. Like NASA’s spacelaunch prize.
Lets not mess with the actual very very reliable arsenal.
Carey Sublette | August 6, 2008
Let me offer my own concluding remarks (I’ll try to be brief).
Replacements CAN be made to match the specs providing that the part do not require a manufacturing process/facility that have long been shut down and the equipment and expert personnel (not just raw materials) no longer available.
This is a key point I want to address.
What sort of specifications does a part have to have to actually work? Its dimensions, its composition, density, its mechanical properties (minimum tensile strength, minimum impact strength, desired range of Young’s modulus, etc., etc.) and so on. These are the sorts of properties that are specified when an engineering design is prepared.
Is the assertion true that there exist parts that can ONLY be replicated to match their relevant specs with a long lost manufacturing process or facility, AND for which the process or facility cannot be reasonably replaced if this is indeed so?
The claim that only a lost irreplaceable manufacturing process can make a functionally equivalent part is what I call an “appeal to alchemy” – that is the imponderables of some specific production procedure that defines an acceptable product rather than the physical characteristics of the product itself.
I assert that that this claim in not valid, but I am willing to adjust my view if someone can give me an “existence proof” – one example in any domain of engineering where this is really the case. I emphasize that it doesn’t have to be in the domain of nuclear weapons engineering, since I don’t accept the principle of “nuclear weapon exceptionalism”, that everything you know about engineering is wrong if the device being engineered is a nuclear weapon.
The one part of the nuclear weapon where the claim of irreplaceable technique seemed most plausible was with the plutonium pit due to the intrinsically exotic nature of plutonium itself, and the specialization of plutonium metal technology. Except – Los Alamos claims that it has already successfully reconstituted a production system for making weapon-ready plutonium pits. Are there parts much harder to replicate than the plutonium pit, which is a problem that has been solved?
In order to move this discussion forward, I am afraid that it is necessary to get down to individual part numbers and have the specific story of each part. That discussion, I am afraid, is not possible with information available to the general public. However, I can point you to a literature on this issue, termed: “Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS)” and the website dmsmc.org that deals with this problem.
The theme of the http://www.dmsms.org website is the management of diminishing supply sources and as the site points out it affects every high tech military system. These issues do incur costs, and have schedule and readiness impacts if not addressed in a timely manner. But you won’t find on this site the assertion that the problems are insoluble.
As FSB says, you can make a case for RRW based on loss of nuclear weapons development skills, and for possibly being a lower cost way of maintaining a long term stockpile (a difficult case to make I expect) – but this is different from claiming that you can’t keep the existing warheads reliable.