Speaking of Foreign Secretaries…
I’ve known for a while that Britain’s current incumbent, David Miliband, personally hosted a small round table on disarmament last month. Most of what I have heard has been on an off-the-record basis so I haven’t said anything here. Now, however, one of the participants has written publicly about it so it’s safe to blog.
Apparently (when he’s not stirring up trouble in the Labour Party), Britain’s relatively new Foreign Secretary likes to re-examine the fundamentals of British foreign policy. He recently focused his attention on nukes by hosting a workshop at his country residence on the disarmament initiative launched by his predecessor last year with a few think tank-types, academics and journalists as well as officials (no, not me).
I have been told not to expect any policy changes to result from the meeting (i.e. UK policy will continue to support taking disarmament seriously) but I am impressed that the Foreign Secretary appears to have a strong enough personal interest in the issue to spend an entire day on it. Coupled with his opposite number’s similar beliefs, this bodes well for the future. Expect more major speeches on this in the autumn…
Major Lemon | August 6, 2008
“…this bodes well for the future”. Sure, for the enemies of democracy.
FSB | August 6, 2008
Lemon,
ever so right, old chap! — discussing non-proliferation and revisiting nuclear strategy is really dangerous for democracy, and plays into the hands of the enemies of democracy.
Much better that you dictate policy to us, and we just do whatever you say. Right?
Want to join me hunting some Rhinos down in the Imperial dark continent old chap? We can play some cricket and have the natives bring out some chai for us.
Oh, what? We aren’t an empire any longer? Poor show, old chap.
Major Lemon | August 6, 2008
FSB, the point I was making is that when the Left talks disarmament its usually unilateral.
FSB | August 6, 2008
Lemon,
who is on the other “lateral”?
The non-existent Iranian nuclear arms? Oh, you mean that Israel should also be forced to give up its nuclear arms. I completely agree with you.
BTW, the NPT calls for “unilateral” disarmament from the NWSs.
You don’t like the NPT — go ahead negotiate another treaty. This is the treaty (almost) everyone has agreed to and it calls for unilateral disarmament.
scud | August 6, 2008
Huh? FSB, since when did the NPT “call for ‘unilateral’ disarmament from the NWSs”?
Ever read Article 6 of said treaty?
Major Lemon | August 6, 2008
FSB writes: “This is the treaty (almost) everyone has agreed to”….this doesn’t follow that it’s in our interest to sign up for it.
FSB | August 7, 2008
Article 6: Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
====
Where are the good-faith negotiations between NWSs towards a treaty on complete disarmament?
Why bust the balls of non-NWSs when NWSs are not living up to Art 6?
FSB | August 7, 2008
Lemon: not sign up for what?
Your country (if that is the US or UK) has already signed up to the NPT.
scud | August 9, 2008
And why bust the balls of NWSs when non-NWSs are not living up to Art 6?
NWSs do much more for Art 6 than NNWSs. Where are the NNWS proposals for general and complete disarmament?
FSB | August 9, 2008
scud,
yeah silly me — I should have expected the nations without nuclear arms to propose to the NWSs to get rid of their nuclear weapons.
Nice to see we have a sense of humor still on ACW.
While I’m waiting for non-NWs to propose complete nuclear disarmament treaties, I will also be standing by and waiting for homeless people to lobby to congress to reduce the capital gains tax.
Can I come over and smoke from your sheesha? — seems like you got the good stuff! ;)
scud | August 11, 2008
FSB, your Aug. 9 post is rhetorical and satirical. Mine is analytical: any serious discussion of rights and responsibilities on nuclear disarmament must take into account the existing state of the law. Since you mentioned Article 6 of the NPT, I’m referring you to its exact language, which is carefully crafted, and deliberately so. There is no “obligation to disarm” in abstracto. Article 6 makes a clear link between nuclear disarmament and the general conditions of peace and security.
But perhaps you thought that the drafters had a sense of humor…
kme | August 11, 2008
FSB: The point is well made, because “general and complete disarmament” in the last clause of article 6 covers conventional as well as nuclear weapons. This is clear, because the first use of “disarmament” in the Article is prefixed with “nuclear”, whereas the second is not.
However, I feel it is extraordinarily unlikely to expect any progress on “general and complete disarmament” until long after the limited case of nuclear-specific disarment is concluded. One only has to look at how problematic even that is, involving only 8 powers with considerable conventional forces at their disposal, to see how hard the “general and complete” case will be. A problem for our great-grandchildren, I suspect.
FSB | August 11, 2008
scud,
your point is well taken also — similarly there is explicit freedom for non-NWSs to enrich U in the NPT, and my point was that ball-busting ought to applied with the spirit of the treaty in mind.
If so, the NWSs would have their balls busted first, then — perhaps — the non-NWSs who are NPT-compliant, as are Brazil and Iran.
scud | August 12, 2008
Alas, my friend FSB, wrong again. The NPT does not mention enrichment, and deliberately so. (During the negotiations, after a vote the framers refused to insert an explicit right to enrichment and reprocessing.)
It does not prohibit enrichment – but the benefits of Article 4 are reserved for those who are compliant with Articles 1 and 2. Iran has violated its safeguards agreement; as well as the NPT itself by conducting some military-only activities.
FSB | August 12, 2008
Charming wit scud — but unfortunately you mislead ACW readers yet again! One more and its a hat-trick! ;)
What “military-only” activities do you refer to?
As you know, it’s often claimed that Iran’s supposedly “hidden” enrichment program means that Iran was “non-compliant” with some vaguely-defined legal obligation. Leaving aside whether Iran’s enrichment program was really “hidden” nor not, this vagueness about Iran’s non-compliance is deliberate: no distinction is made between non-compliance with the actual requirements of the NPT and the IAEA Statute (a serious matter) versus non-compliance with a safeguards agreement due to a “failure to report” otherwise legal activity (a relatively common occurrence.)
This whole argument over whether Iran violated Article XII.C can be easily resolved by simply reading the text of statute. Fortunately, the IAEA Statute is available online. A full reading Article XII.C makes things a bit clearer about what “non-compliance” refers to by setting out three requirements for compliance:
1- The first requirement for compliance is “accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6 of this article”
Paragraph A-6 of Article XII, in turn, states that inspectors are to be sent to account for fissionable materials and ensure none has been diverted for a “military purpose”.
The IAEA did send these inspectors to Iran – many many times. El-Baradei confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his November 2003 report that “to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.” And again, after extensive inspections, El-Baradei wrote Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that “all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is
not diverted to prohibited activities.”
This statement by the IAEA is very significant, legally, because IT MEANS THAT IRAN DID NOT VIOLATE THE NPT.
As Michael Spies of the Lawyer’s Committee on Nuclear Policy has written:
“The conclusion that no diversion has occurred certifies that the state in question is in compliance with its undertaking, under its safeguards agreement and Article III of the NPT, to not divert material to non-peaceful purposes. In the case of Iran, the IAEA was able to conclude in its November 2004 report that that all declared nuclear materials had been accounted for and therefore none had been diverted to military purposes. The IAEA reached this same conclusion in September 2005.”
Testimony presented to the Foreign Select Committee of the British Parliament by Elahe Mohtasham:
“The enforcement of Article III of the NPT obligations is carried out through the IAEA’s monitoring and verification that is designed to ensure that declared nuclear facilities are operated according to safeguard agreement with Iran, which Iran signed with the IAEA in 1974. In the past four years that Iran’s nuclear programme has been under close investigation by the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, as early as November 2003 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors that “to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities … were related to a nuclear weapons programme.” … Although Iran has been found in non-compliance with some aspects of its IAEA safeguards obligations, Iran has not been in breach of its obligations under the terms of the NPT.”
Siddharth Varadarajan of the Hindu wrote:
Despite this finding, the Board of Governors — acting under the pressure of the U.S. and the E-3 — voted on September 24 last year to find Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement in the context of article XIIC of the IAEA Statute. Conveniently overlooked was the fact that article XIIC, as well as articles 18 and 19 of Infcirc 214 [Iran’s Safeguard Agreement], define non-compliance essentially as diversion of safeguarded material for prohibited purposes, something Dr. el-Baradei had explicitly ruled out.
In short, Iran allowed the required IAEA inspections, and no diversion of fissile material to a “military purpose” was found. Thus, Iran did not violate this section of Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute and so there was no basis for referring Iran’s file to the UNSC under the terms of this article.
2- The second requirement under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute is “determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI”
A quich check of Article XI shows that it applies to “Agency Projects” meaning the projects in which the the IAEA has provided technical assistance to a requesting country. And, subparagraph F-4 specifically requires that the assistance provided by the IAEA shall not be used for military purposes and shall be subject to safeguards.
Last I checked, the IAEA did not provide any such assistance to Iran which has been used for military purposes – in fact the US killed the IAEA’s technical assistance to Iran’s enrichment program in 1983, as well as all of Iran’s other contracts with other nations to provide the necessary enrichment technology that Iran was quite legally entitled to obtain. Thus, I don’t see how this provision applies, let alone how Iran could have violated it.
3- The third requirement is compliance “with the measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article”
Subparagraph A-2 of Article XII requires observance of “health and safety” standards. Again, there hasn’t even been an allegation of any violation of this section either.
In short, past breaches of safeguards agreements do not constitute a violation of the statute unless there’s been a diversion for militay purposes – which the IAEA has repeatedly said is not to case in Iran.
In fact the IAEA has found discrepancies the accounting of nuclear material in as many as 15 countries at a time (including S. Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt) – a few of which were later caught conducting secret and potentially weapons-related nuclear experiments – and yet they weren’t referred to the UNSC for supposedly violating Article III of the NPT.
There was thus no basis under Article XII.C to refer Iran’s file to the UNSC, and Iran did not violate the NPT.
When the NWSs give up their hegemony over the UN SC, we may see some justice — till then I wish Iran all the best with its energy independence programme.
Andy | August 13, 2008
I think FSB must be channeling our old friend Hass.
FSB, this topic has been discussed many times before here. Michael Spies, Hass, you and Iran seem to argue that once a nation is caught in violation of its safeguards agreement, all that is required is for the State to submit a new declaration and have it verified and then everyone go on their merry way. That is not the DG’s position, nor the IAEA board position, nor the UNSC’s (nor mine FWIW). Although you’re correct there is no compelling evidence Iran has violated the NPT, it did violate it’s CSA (which is itself a treaty) and was referred for further noncompliance with it’s CSA.
The IAEA’s lead lawyer (and principle author of the Additional Protocol) provides the IAEA view of its legal mandate here. The whole thing is interesting, but skip to paragraph “I” or you can read the relevant quote in an earlier comment here (skip to near the end).
What arrangement is ultimately reached in this matter is really a political and not a legal question, but the fact remains that the Agency had the right and even the obligation to refer the matter to the UNSC for no other reason than the IAEA has zero enforcement power under it’s safeguards agreements. Hence, if the Agency feels a State is not living up to its CSA it has no choice but to refer the matter to the UNSC as the body to provide legal enforcement power if not actual enforcement power.
scud | August 14, 2008
Dear FSB,
1. Note that you did not challenge my first point (correcting you on what the NPT says about enrichment).
2. What I called Iranian ‘military-only’ activities refer to the file presented by DDG Heinonen about warhead design, to the possession of uranium hemispheres casting, etc.
FSB | August 14, 2008
scud:
lovely, yes, you caught me on a technicality — gold star to you — come to the front of the class. i was clearly referring to the spirit of the treaty which the NWSs are evidently pissing on.
andy,
yes, I miss hass too.
why was it OK for the US to propose to iran to enrich U and build Pu processing plants in the 1970s when it was under the shah?
you say:”..what arrangement is ultimately reached in this matter is really a political and not a legal question..”
exactly -yes, it is all politics in fact. if a country is not a friend of the west (which essentially has a stranglehold on the UNSC) then it is sh*t out of luck.
you can paste on a veneer of legalese as thick as scud’s but it remains the fact that iran is being pursued because it is not friendly to the west.
i hope iran will be one day have its own independent fuel cycle, and even were it one day to have nuclear weapons this would be a welcome deterrence to those already possessed by israel, and would add to regional stability. else some Israelis dream up some crazy-ass scenarios
my view? declare the entire middle east a nuclear-weapons-free zone and pursue all parties wanting/having nuclear weapons with equal force.
scud | August 15, 2008
“declare the entire middle east a nuclear-weapons-free zone and pursue all parties wanting/having nuclear weapons with equal force.”
Cheers to the most useful, innnovative and practical political suggestion of the week! With “views” like that, who needs treaties?
FSB | August 16, 2008
Another useful, innnovative and practical political suggestion: abolish the UNSC and have a completely rotating membership among all states.
With the NWSs’ hegemony on the UNSC who can expect non-proliferation and justice to co-exist? We gots us the nuke-cu-lear arms and we make da rules. Nice. Good luck with arms control.