Comments on: Continuous Deterrence: Still Necessary?

By: Lao Tao Ren

Lao Tao Ren — Mon, 18 Aug 2008 15:51:25 +0000

Um… is there any need to ask again who the UK boats deter in light of the events in Georgia?

By: Anders Widebrant

Anders Widebrant — Sun, 17 Aug 2008 13:11:51 +0000

There’s a simple organisational trap here: if you make the patrols a) intermittent and b) highly classified, it will be tempting to nibble at the schedule to save money, from 75% to 50% and so on.

By: FSB

FSB — Fri, 15 Aug 2008 14:43:39 +0000

excellent point Distiller!

It also applies incidentally to space weaponry: you can’t fight blind!

By: Distiller

Distiller — Fri, 15 Aug 2008 09:25:19 +0000

@ sealed orders: How would a surviving SSBN know against whom to launch? Hmm?? Just assuming, because yesterday evening tensions were high? Or like a nuke on Moscow is never a bad idea?

Practically, a launch from a surviving SSBN to get even with ….. (fill in) would have to rely on external verification of who launched first. A quasi automated “sealed launch order” akin to a dead hand is not really practical.

By: Shashank

Shashank — Mon, 11 Aug 2008 09:58:20 +0000

With regard to the original post, I interpreted as meaning that survivability is besides the point: it’s the ambiguity that maintains the deterrence value. Assuming that an adversary can’t actually observe how many subs have been destroyed by a first-strike, they would be forced to factor in – with some probability – the likelihood that one remains, and that it’s sealed instructions from the PM specify a retaliatory strike (or that communication links remain and a second strike will be authorized). And as for the existential argument, the mere possibility of a sub surviving would concentrate the mind wonderfully.

On that line of argument, I’ve always wondered why it wouldn’t be possible to replace all you warheads with bags of sand and paper cut outs, and just pretend you’re practicing CASD without bearing the cost, occasionally getting some subs to surface and look busy.

By: Anonymous

Anonymous — Sun, 10 Aug 2008 22:17:38 +0000

For Pete’s sake, Mr. Acton. A Cambridge physicist should know enough logic to understand that ‘existential deterrence’ is of no relevance in the case of China or Russia.

By: Distiller

Distiller — Sun, 10 Aug 2008 17:33:25 +0000

The U.K. nuclear forces are foremost a symbolic force. It does not really matter, whether one boat is at sea or not.

By: ner

ner — Sat, 09 Aug 2008 07:37:21 +0000

Let’s not forget that the government’s arguments were marshalled for the sole purpose of renewing the Trident system as it is currently configured for reasons that have a lot to do with Britain’s self-identity as a major, interventionist power, as a nuclear weapon state, as no. 1 ally of the US and for Labour an identity as being strong on defence (and not leaving the French as the only nuclear power in Europe) and much less to do with formal deterrence rationales.

Nevertheless, a host of questionable ‘strategic’ arguments are presented, including the ‘need’ for CASD, for a nuclear delivery capability of global reach, and to provide a second-centre of nuclear decision-making in NATO. These arguments need to be picked apart and the case for nuclear ‘business as usual’ to mid-century reconsidered.

By: Lao Tao Ren

Lao Tao Ren — Sat, 09 Aug 2008 03:38:58 +0000

@manoj

The UK nukes deter Argies, regardless of what they attack the UK with.

By: Lao Tao Ren

Lao Tao Ren — Sat, 09 Aug 2008 02:08:46 +0000

At the rate supersonic cruise missiles are advancing, what about putting the deterrent on cruise missiles launched from torpedo tubes?

That will give the SSNs something more to do.