For the discerning reader, the work of Dr. Stephen Blank has always been a favorite.
Dr. Blank has recently published an article, which may be obtained free of charge, here, at the Jamestown Foundation’s webpage. Of particular note is the attention he draws to the potential sale of Russian heavy bombers and ALCMs to the PRC. And of particular interest to the reader may be this quote: ”China apparently now argues the main requirement for such a bomber is that it carries more long-distance cruise missiles.”
And further,
[I]f Moscow supplied the Kh-22 (NATO designation: As-4 Kitchen) supersonic air-delivered cruise missile, this long-range anti-ship cruise missile could change the balance in the South China Sea (OSC-FBIS, January 26; China News Center, January 24; Vzgliad Online, January 22).
It is worth thinking about the present state of both ALCM and SLCM technology, the world over. A good deal has been said in the past year about increasing tension in Asia, be it Chinese territorial claims, strains between U.S. allies, and of course, the DPRK. But not much is said about the kind of technology the PRC would need, and from where it is getting it, to enable it to deal with the U.S. “pivot.”
JFC Fuller | February 17, 2013
An interesting article but I have three observations.
1) It relies upon the accuracy of Russian news reporting on Russian defence exports to China which is notoriously inaccurate; the Russian language versions of the articles regarding the Amur deal are far from convincing for instance.
2) It follows a trap that many older-school analysts have fallen into; that being that China is the Soviet Union Mk2 and will therefore emulate that power militarily with the final stage being to simply acquire its military hardware. The evidence is now overwhelmingly against this theory. China is China and is doing a Chinese thing.
3) Perhaps unsurprisingly when one considers the potency of the air defence capability is faces regionally China has long relied upon its ballistic and cruise missile forces to provide its long range strike capability- both nuclear and conventional. It has deployed large numbers of both missile classes in ground launched configurations and there is some evidence of air launched cruise missiles as well. Thus that the Chinese would see a bomber as a cruise missile carrier is perhaps not surprising.
blowback | February 17, 2013
The Kh-22 entered service with the Soviet Union in 1962. You don’t think that the Chinese couldn’t do better from scratch? And after 50 years, the United States hasn’t developed a system to defeat the Kh-22?
John Schilling | February 17, 2013
After fifty years, the United States has developed so many systems to defeat the Kh-22 that the most famous of these – the F-14 Tomcat – has served out its term and been honorably retired. But yes, the Kh-22 is obsolescent at best, representing an outdated concept of how to conduct a long-range missile attack, and is unlikely to be highly effective against modern US-style air defenses.
Which is not to say that China is foolish for seeking an air-launched cruise missile capability. But big and conspicuous, flying high and merely supersonic, is not the way to do that if the target is the United States or any of its major allies. And it isn’t clear how the Kh-22 could be used as the foundation for anything significantly better.
Jeannick | February 17, 2013
.
Hmmm, how old is the B-52 ?
George William Herbert | February 17, 2013
My question would be, is this a theater or a strategic bomber concept.
Chinese Bear bombers with long range cruise missiles – or for that matter, gravity bombs – are a valid second strike against anywhere in the continental US, for one-way missions, and unrefueled return missions against Alaska and Hawaii (cruise missiles or no).
Backfires seem only useful at most for theater roles. It looks like it’s 5,000 km from northeast China to central Alaska, more than (Backfire combat radius unrefueled + Russian cruise missile range). 6,000 km to Hawaii. Perhaps useful against Guam etc.
So, south china sea, and theater roles, unless I am missing something. Which is an important “strategic theater” – more likely confrontation area – but not one in which nuclear roles seem applicable.
David | February 18, 2013
Just wondering if the threat is not to the surface ships, but to the AWACS planes? At Mach 4, with a radar seeker, what would protect an AWACS plane? Especially if multiple ALCM’s were launched from a bomber, swarming the defense.
para38 | February 19, 2013
” this long-range anti-ship cruise missile could change the balance in the South China Sea”
Checking the distances over the SCS and considering the PRCs current range of equipment and its capabilities, I find this comment very odd. To be more precise, the PRC has at least three and soon four strike-capable platforms, which are able to deliver stand-off weapons (ALCMs and supersonic AShM with ranges between 200 and 1000+ km) to moving and fixed targets well beyond the SCS. Specifically these are Su-30 MKK/MK2, JH-7A, H-6 (three variants capable of carrying up to four ALCM) and soon the J-16 (replacing older Flankers as dedicated strike AC).
This does not even consider surface-based Chinese capabilities (ie ships – DDG and FAC-M plus shore batteries for SRBM/MRBM). It is hard to see, why the assets of regional parties involved in those disputes would have a drastically harder task with inbound Tu-22M than what is potentially at hand there already.
Even assuming that this changing balance is meant to concern the USN exclusively, the apparent concern by the USN over Chinas AShBM-capabilities would have it appear, that this rather suspect trade is somewhat redundant, when it comes to risk-calculations regarding high-value targets (ie CVN).
Furthermore, to substantiate, what JFC Fuller already mentioned, sourcing is the actual issue with this whole article. Not only was the first mention of such a purchase for Tu-22M made in a Russian newspaper, with no reliable sources, dating back to 2003, every subsequent report is basically rehashing the same old story, adding further un-sourced claims in the best tradition of gossip-evolution.
There are other significant problems with Dr. Blanks observations:
Quote “In some cases, as with the H-6, for example, Russian influence on the construction seems visually apparent.” – The H-6 is a license-built Chinese version of the Tu-16, visual influences should not come as a shock.
“Thus, it is interesting that apparently for the third time, Russian recently resurfaced the rumor that Moscow was selling China the TU-22M3 (Backfire) bomber.”
- Ignoring editing here, whoever made that claim caused Russian officials representing Rosoboronexport to strongly deny any Chinese interest in and practicality of Tu-22M or its tooling, calling the whole thing “a pure newspapers duck”. This is the only official statement in regard to this affair in ten years, thus somewhat authoritative, yet its strangely missing from the article, which is otherwise busy citing dubious sources.
“One example is the deal for Russia to sell China Amur-class submarines and gradually shift to co-production, involving technology transfer and allowing China to be the first to import these systems, announced in December 2012.”
- This one probably takes the cake for gross misrepresentation. Tracking down the sourcing here, not only has there been no announcement of any deal, the entire story originates with Kommersant citing ‘anonymous’ sources within Rosoboronexport and stating, that a deal is to be signed in 2014 (two years from initial reporting, even the Indians are doing better). It was then simply repeated by Janes et al, showing a discouraging lack of journalistic research.
It should be noted, that the Lada-class SSK so far has been an impressive disaster even by Russian standards, with the first of class launched 2004 and still not operational, whereas China so far managed to put seven hulls of its own new Yuan-class into the water since that time. The Yuan-class is Kilo-sized (ie. almost twice as large as the Lada) and suspected to carry significant Russian technology plus an AIP. Fact-checking here should have raised eyebrows with Dr. Blank.
Frankly and with all due respect, I wonder, if the first line of this entire entry was meant to be sarcastic.
thomas | February 20, 2013
I doubt very much there is any sarcasm in play. Having watched ROE’s contracting for years, I also doubt that we’ll know in most cases wether or not they have sold something until it shows up in any region.
I am also aware of the sourcing issue, having read these articles for years. I doubt what’s publicly available on PRC cruise capabilities, by the same token–most of that reporting is Kommersant-class.
Thank you for your comment.
bob | February 19, 2013
The Kh-22 always seemed to me to be a knock-off copy of Blue Steel – the twin chamber rocket engine credited to the Isayev bureau looked suspiciously like the UK Stentor engine. So similar in fact, that I assumed that there was a (so far uncovered or untold) spying story behind it.
Perhaps “knock-off copy” was a bit inaccurate, I believe that the missile design was re-engineered to substantially improve performance and represents the first substantial use of titanium by Russian aerospace.
I thought that Kitchen had been withdrawn from service approx 5 years ago. Perhaps they were mothballed for future sale, or re-purposed as target drones.
China as a buyer? Not. North Korea? Mmmmm. Iran? Oh!
Dean | February 20, 2013
Acquiring a strategic or theater missle carrier, especially an obsolete one, armed with Kitchen missles we already have long since had multiple defenses for, is not a military move. It is an economic one. Watch for Bolton or some other to speak out about an “increasing” threat next, as he tell us why we need to expand or protect military spending to meet this “new” threat. That constituency and its representatives in Congress will make sure we continue to deficit spend. The long war is an economic one.
Rene | February 23, 2013
On an indirectly related note, I just came across a story on Xinhua which refers to “the successful installation of a domestically produced uranium enrichment centrifuge for industrial use” in China. Do we know anything about what type of centrifuge this is? Is it based on a Russian design?
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/22/c_132186298.htm
krepon | February 24, 2013
plz mail your answers to Tehran.