In a little-noticed press release, the U.S. Department of Justice announced last December that it had won a guilty plea from the China Nuclear Industry Huaxing Construction Co. Ltd. (or simply Huaxing) for its criminal conspiracy to export to Pakistan’s Chashma II Nuclear Power Plant from the United States high-performance epoxy coatings in violation of U.S. law. The DOJ press release stated:
It is believed that today’s plea marks the first time that a PRC corporate entity has entered a plea of guilty in a U.S. criminal export matter.
The details of the criminal conspiracy read like standard stuff for those accustomed to the laws in question, and how they are violated. Until you consider the sentence above.
It is no small matter. If China cooperated in this case, that’s worthy of note. If they did, why and how, and what else (if anything) was learned as a result about China’s nonproliferation policies and the strength of its commitment to them?
China won membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 on the back of many promises made, and at the time, the question in everyone’s mind was what else do they want for Pakistan, after the Chashma I and II NPPs? (Chashma III and IV, naturally.)
Also, with some recent reports surfacing to the effect that China and Turkey are now supporting Pakistan’s entry into the NSG, the question arises, is Pakistan to be admitted to the NSG?
China won a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement (a 123 agreement) with the United States based on its nonproliferation policy, or one should say revisions made thereto over the course of 13 years. It took the Executive branch from 1985 to 1998 to certify to Congress pursuant to Public Law 99-183 (the law approving the China 123 agreement, as well as relevant sections in the Tiananmen sanctions law) that:
The Government of the People’s Republic of China has provided additional information concerning its nuclear nonproliferation policies and that, based on this and all other information available to the United States Government, the People’s Republic of China is not in violation of paragraph (2) of section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Now, does the epoxy conspiracy cast doubt on Chinese nonproliferation policy–i.e., the policy that was the subject of the 1998 determination/certification–or, if there was Chinese cooperation, does it highlight a rare case of cooperation in such matters?
What is the present position of the U.S. government on further Chinese nuclear exports to Pakistan beyond Chashma I and II?
Has any information that was obtained by the U.S. government in connection with the epoxy conspiracy caused the U.S. government to review whether or not China is or may be in violation of section 129? (That’s very unlikely to be the case: Chashma I and II were “grandfathered” at the time of the PRC’s entry into the NSG, and given that they are both safeguarded under Pakistan’s INFCIRC/66 agreement, as civilian NPPs, China is unlikely to be in violation of section 129 concerning lawful exports to either NPP; and the plea makes no mention of items or conduct falling under section 129. The nexus, however, between the Huaxing plea and the complicated past and present PRC-Pakistan nuclear relationship raises its profile.)
It doesn’t take a law degree or years of asking questions of any administration to know that the answers to the above questions are probably: Not really; we don’t like it, but prefer not to discuss it; and no. With 29 reactors under construction in China, some of them under U.S. license (the first reactor export licenses not being issued until 2004, and with key contracts on the line in 2013-2015), some would no doubt prefer not to highlight this case.
If the guilty plea rests on PRC cooperation, that’s something that the Justice Department could probably detail before (a) the expiration of the U.S.-China 123 agreement in 2015 and (b) the PRC-Turkey bid, if it’s real, results in Pakistani membership in the NSG, or the crafting of U.S. instructions for the U.S. representative to the NSG on the matter are finalized.
madhur | February 25, 2013
The United States knows that China is in violation of her NSG commitment. But America remains quite because she does not want to confront China regarding its proliferation to Pakistan.
Soon the international NPT regime will collapse because of its inherent contradictions. India,Pakistan,North Korea and then Iran … the number of pink elephants outside the tent are growing.
Mansoor | February 25, 2013
Pakistan and China entered into a long-term civil nuclear cooperation agreement on Sept 15, 1986 which called for the establishment of at least four IAEA safeguarded power reactors at Chashma on the bank of the river Indus. Chashma was designed to be a Civil Nuclear Power Complex as per the long-term nuclear power program developed by PAEC and endorsed by the IAEA as far back as 1973.
When China entered into this agreement with Pakistan, it was prior to signing the NPT and long-before it entered into the NSG.
The NPT regime effectively died the day the Indo-US deal was finalized and a special waiver given to a non-NPT state whose 1974 nuclear test led to the formation of the NSG itself.
It is quite interesting that there is selective and discriminatory interpretation and application of non-proliferation norms and principles for different group of countries–with India being accepted as a de-facto nuclear weapon state without it accepting any NPT obligations while bestowing a NNWS with all the benefits and privileges of a weapon-state–which is also indirectly being facilitated to retain the option of vertical expansion in its weapons program outside safeguards (breeder, centrifuge, reprocessing, production reactor, SLBM, ABM, and SSBN programs).
At the same time, acutely increasing conventional and huge fissile material asymmetries continue to exist and grow in the region and Pakistan is being expected to exercise restraint and its very modest nuclear energy program is getting so much attention.
Bridge Seller | February 26, 2013
Sounds like someone’s feelings are hurt. If you really buy what you just wrote: “very modest nuclear energy program is getting so much attention.” I have a bridge here in Brooklyn to sell you.
Mantej | February 25, 2013
Let’s see how NSG resolves this issue. this is going to be interesting. pakistan will be dead against india’s NSG membership, because it will give india veto power over pakistan’s membership. but eventually India will the membership.