Arms Control Wonk

When I hear “Dimona,” I think super-secret Israeli nuke program. I mean, doesn’t everyone? Little did I know that other grand secrets can be found in this little part of the Israeli desert. Who cares about the nukes when you suddenly discover that Dimona is in fact also home of the nicest bathroom in Israel.

But let me start at the beginning.

I was traveling in Israel last week. I’ll post some fun pictures of the Lebanon border (big fence) the Syria border (big mountains) and the security wall (again, big fence) later. Of course, I couldn’t help but notice signs we passed with arrows towards Dimona. Signs for the town of course, but I didn’t sweat over the Deadly Arsenals map for nothing. The reactor is close. (Here all nice and blurry on google earth).

As luck would have it, we did drive right through the town of Dimona, and along the road where, for a good long stretch, you can see the reactor dome sort of gleaming in the distance. Driving from the town of Dimona towards the Dead Sea, a large sparse area with low rolling hills opens up on the right. A serious looking security fence runs along the side of the road.

The Israeli guide on the trip told a nice story about the super-secret Israeli Krembo chocolate factory over to the right. So secret is the Krembo recipe that Israel has shot down a plane which wandered over the factory, and the man who revealed chocolate secrets to the world was put in jail for a long long time. Very cute. I was amused.

Now the good stuff. In the town of Dimona itself, there is a shopping mall. Rolling into the parking lot, I started hearing comments about the bathrooms. The mall looked decent, average even. But then I turned a corner and was witness to the super-secret Israeli bathroom program, no fences. No, it’s not a brochure. I sneaked a super secret photo.

Given my prior obsession with the Litvinenko polonium-210 poisoning case, this op-ed in IHT, “How to Stop Radiation Terrorism” caught my attention. The authors, Peter D. Zimmerman, James M. Acton and M. Brooke Rogers, outline some of the dangerous radiological substances and how they could be used by terrorists. (The op-ed is a preview to a forthcoming article in Survival. There will be a discussion in London next week.)

I suppose a perpetrator of a radiological attack could be, as the authors describe, a terrorist. But given the opportunities for a sneaky, subtle, and highly malicious act, the perpetrators could just as well (and perhaps even more likely) be serial-killers, crazies, or hit-men.

The authors point out that radiological substances could be used in public way to kill only a few people but cause panic. Ok, this is in line with the concept that terrorists want a lot of people watching but not a lot of people dead.

But the example of the Litvinenko case and the point in the article that these attacks could also be “sneaky, unaccompanied by a flash and bang,” suggests another question. Who is the kind of terrorist who wants to hide an attack so that neither responsibility nor the goal is really known? In the Litvinenko case, there are no clear conclusions to be drawn from the fact that a radiological method was used over a conventional one. To make some point? As a publicity stunt? In favor of whom?

The recommendations in the article on protecting radiological sources do apply regardless of perpetrator, even if he is a KGB goon. I am just noticing how we all like to talk about terrorists so much. Clearly, they take away your PhD if you can’t manage to incorporate “terrorism” into your op-ed title.

Also, I can’t help but wonder… terrorism by ingestion, inhalation, or immersion is a lot of work. (Plus, as Litvinenko’s killers know, you have to be real careful touching that radioactive stuff.) Seems like there are so many other, and equally scary ways to terrorize a population.

The article has some great terms though, including “smoky bomb” and “I-cubed attack” (aka ingestion, inhalation, immersion). I only realized at the end that while reading it I had been saying “ice-cube attack” in my head. Yeah, the ice-cubes are coming to get you too.

T&D Happy Hour is happening on Thursday August 2. The usual: Big Hunt, upstairs, 6pm and on.

We will be discussing pressing issues of national security, such as my personal favorite topics: world leaders on personal transport devices, Russian poisonings, and animal spies of any kind. Oh, and drinking beer. Naturally.

Don’t miss it. Jeffrey may jet off to another fancy conference any minute now, so its next Thursday or bust.

Please invite anyone who gasp does not read the blog.

I have often wondered, what kind of intelligence capabilities would we need to know whether the Iranians were hiding a nuclear weapons program?

Now, eureka. Clearly, we need spy squirrels. Even those cunning Brits are doing it.

Thank you NBC blog, this made my day:

The official Islamic Republic News Agency reported this week, that police had, ahem, “arrested” 14 squirrels on charges of espionage.

The rodents were found near the Iranian border, allegedly equipped with eavesdropping devices, according to IRNA.

[snip]

IRNA said that the squirrels were discovered by intelligence services – but were captured by police officers several weeks ago.

The reaction to the report on Tehran’s streets was varied – from disbelief to assigning guilt for the alleged infraction.

“No, I had not heard about this, but it does not surprise me, foreign countries are always meddling in Iran,” said Hassan Mohmmadi, a fast-food vendor.

Mohammadi asked me if I knew where the squirrels were from, and I told him that I didn’t know. Then he came to his own conclusions. “I bet they were British squirrels, they are the most cunning,” he replied.

Happy friday.

The Kremlin has issued a decree suspending Russia’s participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE). The link is to the Russian, and the English should be up shortly at www.kremlin.ru. From Reuters:

The decree suspended Russia’s role in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) pact, adopted in 1990 to limit the number of tanks, heavy artillery and combat aircraft deployed and stored between the Atlantic and Russia’s Ural mountains.

Russia has accused the West of failing to ratify an amended version signed in 1999 to take into account the new post-Cold War situation. Talks last month with NATO states ended without progress.

A NATO spokesman said on Saturday of the Russian suspension: “If this is confirmed the Secretary General very much regrets this decision. The allies consider this treaty to be an important cornerstone of European security.”

A major source of friction is NATO’s insistence on preserving “flanking arrangements” which ban large concentrations of forces and materiel near some borders.

Russia objects to that provision because it limits Russian troop movements within Russian territory although Moscow says its border areas have become more unstable since the Soviet Union broke up in 1991.

More updates soon.

In the last few days, Presidents Bush and Putin were meeting, talking about their wives, fishing and playing with dogs. Oh, but there is more:

As a gift, Bush gave Putin a Segway transporter, and he reportedly gave it a try. The former president and first lady own three Segways and regularly zip around their sprawling property on them.

A sign at the entrance to Walker’s Point reads: “Caution. President on Segway. Slow Down.”

There just has to be a photo of this Putin on Segway moment. If you find it, serious brownie points.

On missile defense, the theme at Kennebunkport seems to be anything but Europe. Putin offered to upgrade the Azerbaijan radar or even built a new one in Russia. Just as long as the US gives up this interceptors in Europe business. Bush said, hey Vladmir, good idea, but I still want Poland and Czech Republic.

(Maybe it’s just me, but does anyone else notice how both Presidents really make a point of calling each other by their first names? Damn, just look at what great buddies we are!)

So in general, news out of the weekend getaway sounds like more of the same. I don’t think anyone expected anything groundbreaking anyway. Apart from the Segway news, there was this Joint Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov. At 102 words this statement really clears things up for those of us who have been wondering as to what will happen after START. Russia and the U.S. agree on the “development of a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces.” The word “verified” feels missing from that sentence.

I want to follow up on a few issues on President Putin’s Gabala radar proposal. First, U.S. and Russia are currently talking about rather different conceptions of the plan, and second, both high level Russian officials and the press are gearing up for the plan to be rejected.

My Plan, Your Plan

Russia intends the proposal to be instead of missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. Putin’s proposal, officials say, make the U.S. plans in Europe unnecessary. The U.S. however is talking about the Gabala radar as in addition to the currently planned interceptor and radar sites.

(I’ve also heard some questions about whether Azerbaijan itself is approving of this use of a radar on its territory. As far as I’ve read, they are game. Also, Putin did tell the G8 that he agreed on the proposal with Azerbaijan’s president. Somehow I doubt Azerbaijan would contradict that.)

Chief of the Russian Army’s General Staff General Baluevsky said yesterday (more here in Russian) that if the U.S. does not give a direct answer to Putin’s proposal by the start of the meeting in Kennebunkport (July 1-2), Russia will know that Washington has made its choice to reject the proposal. Russian press called it an ultimatum, but it kind of seems like they just wanted to use the “U” word. “Yeah, we’ll like totally know what’s up if you don’t say anything!” Umm, ok.

Current reports on Russia’s possible response are along the lines of pre-G8 summit missile pointing. Baluevsky noted the “Iskander missile and other systems.” (Iskander has a declared range which is within INF limits, but its actual maximum range may exceed that.)

What about INF?

However, what I am keeping an eye out for is whether threat to withdraw from the INF treaty starts to come up again. Russian officials talked up a storm about INF withdrawal a few months ago, calling it an asymmetric response to the U.S. Now the response appears to focus on existing missiles and where they are targeted.

What happened to the INF threats? At least two possibilities: 1) Russia noticed that the U.S. did not seem to care about their INF withdrawal while targeting missile talk gets everyone all riled up, or 2) there is a sense that Russia itself may have something to lose from INF withdrawal (eg. they have enough trouble with developing the currently planned missiles, so maybe opening competition with the U.S. on more is not the best plan), while existing missiles can threaten Europe too.

Russia did successful test the Bulava missile on Thursday. The last failed test was in December.

This is it. My last day in Moscow.

Some last notes from the motherland? Well, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at the Carnegie Moscow Center yesterday. I spent the morning worrying about how not to get him stuck in the elevator and making small talk with the security people.

More details on Lavrov’s talk – a few points about the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty and missile defense- when I get a transcript in a few days. For now I will just point out that he is 1) very tall – I guess I somehow expected all top officials to be around Putin’s stature – and 2) very tan…vacation on the beach? solarium at home? It’s unclear.

***

I am off to pack and triple check all the little slips of paper I need in order to be let out of the country. I’m sure I will see some of you at the Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference next week.

The National Security Archive has released a new electronic briefing book on U.S. opposition to the Taiwanese nuclear program in the 1970’s.

As is usual of the Archive’s excellent briefing books, compiled from documents acquired under FOIA and annotated with expert commentary, this new one presents a narrative by William Burr and links to PDFs of about 55 documents on U.S. diplomacy with Taiwan on the nuclear issue.

The documents show that counter-proliferation diplomacy is hard even with friendly states, to say nothing of countries like North Korea or Iran:

Even a dependent ally, such as Taiwan, tried hard to resist U.S. pressures to abandon suspect nuclear activities and kept Washington guessing whether it had really given them up.

The briefing book is part of a new Nuclear Vault section of the National Security Archive’s website. It’s pretty spiffy with all the nuclear-related briefing books organized by state and topic area.

As we all know, Russia and the U.S. have been in a tiff over the U.S. proposal to put missile defense installations in Europe (Ten interceptors in Poland and an x-band radar in the Czech Republic.)

Ok, more than a tiff. Putin said Russia can’t accept such things so close to its borders. Bush said it’s not about you; it’s about the evil states. Putin threatened to point missiles at Europe. The whole thing looked to be going rapidly downhill right in the middle of the G8 Summit.

Then Putin proposed the U.S. and Russia cooperate on missile defense by using an existing early warning radar in Azerbaijan. Seems like everyone – U.S. government, American and U.S. experts, press – was taken by surprise.

It is a very clever proposal. The terms are far from clear, but its political implications are currently more significant than the technical ones. Russia gets to step away gracefully, avoiding getting stuck in a corner; the U.S. was not conceeding to Russia’s very public kicking and screaming, while Russia’s own position had started to appear impractically rigid. Now, Russia looks good, creative, cooperative. And it’s the U.S. which will look lousy if they just reject the proposal. Don’t you want to talk?!

Oh and what if the proposal is crappy to begin with? Well, it will take a little while to figure that out. In the mean time, let’s all just calm down, have a cup of tea, and spend a long long time negotiating. You have to hand it to Putin; very impressive stalling tactic.

Speaking at a hearing at the European Parliament in Brussels earlier this week, CDI’s Victoria Samson took the analysis on missile defense cooperation in an interesting direction, noting that while cooperation on such systems sounds like a good idea, so far the U.S. has not been very good at it:

At any rate, the United States has had great difficulty in peer-to-peer cooperation on missile defense before. Right now, it is working on the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) with Germany and Italy. Perhaps “working” is too strong a word for the progress of this program, which wobbles along as the country partners bicker about funding. In fact, originally there was to be a new interceptor developed for this program. But a few years ago, the United States rather peremptorily decided that instead they would be using the PAC-3 interceptor and told its two other partners as such – not an encouraging signal for how well the United States can give and take.

In fact, the United States and Russia have tried in the past to cooperate on missile defense. The Russian American Observation Satellite or RAMOS program illustrates how much distrust remains between the two countries when it comes to defense issues. RAMOS began in 1997 with the goal of having each country create an earth-observing satellite that could detect and track missiles. Within one year, the United States military began to try to unilaterally change the program so that it would be more of an “operational benefit” to U.S. satellites, as opposed to a cooperative effort with Russia that could be a confidence building measure. Arguments ensued over funding and the direction of the program, causing suspicion and eroding support on both sides. Finally, the situation devolved so that funding for RAMOS disappeared in the 2005 budget request released in February 2004, an omission that effectively killed the program.

In addition, Victoria points out that cooperation on missile defense may have complicated implications on states’ involvement in the weaponization of space:

But this discussion does ignore one very crucial consequence of collaborating on the U.S. missile defense system: that this will eventually lead to collaborating on the weaponization of space. The United States intends to create a space-based layer of missile defense that would have interceptors on orbit with the goal of using them to shoot down enemy missiles during their boost or initial phase of flight.

[snip]

The United States of course wouldn’t expect another country to collaborate on building or launching space-based interceptors. However, the early warning data that it would collect for its overall missile defense networks – i.e., the radars that already exist in Fylingdales and Thule or the new one proposed for Eastern Europe – would very likely be used by the United States for aiming space-based weapons, seeing as it wouldn’t make sense for the United States to build an entirely new network specifically for its space weapons. This would in effect make those countries who agree to work with the United States on missile defense in general collaborationists on the weaponization of space. This line of reasoning has already been demonstrated. In February 2005, Canada preemptively told the United States that it did not want to cooperate on its missile defense system because the Canadian population considered it a first step to the weaponization of space.

It is also interesting to look at the Azerbaijan proposal in light of Russia-Iran relations. Putin’s proposal is yet another indicator of increasing distance between the two countries. Azerbaijan and Iran are next door after all, and Putin has also mentioned the possibility of interceptor cites in Turkey and Iraq. In commenting on the proposal last week, one Russian defense expert (who makes the Godfather quote reference in his article) noted how quickly Putin seemed to sell out Ahmadinejad.

See more on Putin’s Azerbaijan proposal at Danger Room and RussianForces.org.