Here is my counteroffer for the P5+1

Iran:

-Cease all enrichment beyond 5%.
-Remove from Iran (to a neutral party, i.e. Russia) all fuel/pre-cursor stock (i.e. yellow cake, UF6, U308, metal) enriched beyond 5% except that which is actually INSIDE of the TRR being irradiated.
-Cease construction and de-install all centrifuge SWP capacity that exceeds that required for CURRENTLY in operation civilian power plants. (Build another plant, re-install more centrifuges as needed to power the plant.)
-Fill the Arak heavy water reactor with cement.
-Full cooperation on Parchin and another “possible military dimensions” nuclear weapons development site identified in the future.
-External removal, storage, and recycling as needed of spent fuel at the expense of the West/Russia.
-Full adoption of the additional protocol. Full monitoring of compliance by the IAEA.

The West:

-End to all economic sanctions.
-Promise to protect and defend Iranian civilian nuclear installations from foreign attack by any party as long as the above agreement is being complied with. (No promises if the above is violated.)
-Promise to supply any addition 20% fuel for medical isotope purposes (TRR) for no charge; to the extent that fuel is actually loaded into the TRR (i.e. poisoned for nuclear weapons purposes).
-Full cooperation in building a non-proliferative (5% UO2) civilian nuclear electric power generation plants sufficient to power all of Iran.

The above is to be agreed, in writing by both Rohani and Khamenei within 60 days; i.e. before the assumption of the Presidency of Rohani. Implementation of the above begins immediately following signature.

I believe this solves the problem for both sides. Then we can put this all behind us.

Omaha World-Herald – Local boy made good returns, performs the assurance mission.

http://www.omaha.com/article/20130619/NEWS/130619588/1707

Bulletin o’ the Atomic Scientists. Alex Wellerstein tells stories of Los Alamos through the lens of the security badge photo-taker.

http://www.thebulletin.org//multimedia/faces-made-bomb

This debate about whether the United States will insist that countries developing nuclear power forswear their rights to acquire E&R — from any other country — as a condition for a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. The issue is not about U.S. supply, but the rights of the other country to engage in the production of nuclear fuel.

Demanding conditions that our partners will not accept is no way to promote global nonproliferation. UAE, which already had a national policy to renounce E&R, agreed to the “gold standard” over the weekend, and Taiwan, which renounced E&R in 1979, volunteered for it. But the other countries the United States has asked to forswear E&R — including Vietnam, Jordan and Saudi Arabia — have not accepted the U.S. terms. These failures to conclude an agreement represent a big net loss for U.S. nonproliferation interests, given that the United States has achieved none of the bilateral assurances and guarantees of Section 123, including consent rights that are not required by other suppliers.

It is important to limit transfers of E&R, but unilateral U.S. restrictions do not help, and even harm more effective approaches.

If the Flemish got ahold of nuclear weapons, they might use them against the Walloons. Or vice versa.

I do not understand how us proliferating E&R to stay “in the loop” with a given buyer actually helps the situation, unless countries we’re doing business with otherwise would turn bad absent US E&R technology deliveries. In general, ones we might consider selling to under any reasonable circumstance have been allies or cooperative nations we can influence anyways. It’s the ones we would not have sold to that are turning out dangerous.

All us having sold more E&R tech would have accomplished is there being more E&R out there.

“For the U.S. domestic industry, however, it is no longer the 1980s when U.S. commercial interests dominated the civil nuclear landscape. Today, U.S. companies face significant competitive challenges, despite the fact that much of the world’s nuclear manufacturing and supply capability still relies on designs and technologies developed in the United States.” (http://csis.org/publication/exploring-impact-domestic-regulation-civil-nuclear-exports)

Fred McGoldrick has pointed out in a report published by the CSIS Proliferation Prevention Program that the “diminished U.S. role in the international nuclear market has important consequences.” (http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_McGoldrick_NuclearTradeControls_Web.pdf) Among these, he identifies a reduction of materials under U.S. control, a greater prominence of other countries’ less stringent nonproliferation controls, and increasing difficulty for the United States to “onerous unilateral nonproliferation conditions on cooperating partners.”

This last point is critical for U.S. policy on whether to condition bilateral nuclear cooperation on a partner country’s renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing technologies (E&R), widely known as the “gold standard.” As Fred explains:

“Unilateral actions by themselves usually do not bring about desired results and can often be counterproductive. If potential importing states believe that the U.S. demands are excessive or that they deny them their rights, they can turn to alternative suppliers who can provide the nuclear materials, equipment and technology they seek for their civil nuclear programs. It is, therefore, vital that the United States work closely with other suppliers in moving forward on the agenda outlined above, although reaching agreement may be painfully slow and not always to Washington’s satisfaction. To continue to play a leadership role, the United States will need to overcome the obstacles that are preventing it from competing effectively in the international market.”

Mr. McGoldrick is not alone in this analysis. CSIS President John Hamre and several other former defense and national security officials recently wrote to the president that reduced U.S. share in the global nuclear market means that “the United States is in an increasingly weak position to unilaterally impose onerous requirements on potential buyers of civil nuclear technology, simply because buyers have so many alternatives to U.S. sources of supply.” (http://atomicinsights.com/wp-content/uploads/Hamre-letter-to-WH.pdf) The letter continues:

“It follows that, in order to restore its nonproliferation influence around the globe, the United States Government must find ways to strengthen the competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry, and avoid policies that threaten to further weaken it.”

Regarding the proposal to require the “gold standard in all future Section 123 agreements, the letter states:

“Historically we have managed this process on a sensible case-by-case basis. If we adopt a much more restrictive approach, we will not prevent countries from acquiring nuclear technology, but instead will encourage nations to turn to suppliers that do not impose difficult standards. The non-proliferation regime is weakened in that circumstance.

“We share your Administration’s concern about the risks associated with the potential spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing. But as our nation seeks to reduce these risks, we must be careful not to diminish America’s influence in the international civil nuclear marketplace. America’s nuclear industry exports are shrinking, and this is bad for nonproliferation policy.”

In seeking Donnelly’s “ideal future use of nuclear power,” it is vital that we not make the perfect the enemy of the good. The “gold standard” would do just that. Unlike in 1978, the United States does not wield the influence to impose new E&R requirements unilaterally. Today, we must rely on other approaches.

I am happy at the idea of clean energy, including nuclear. I am not at all happy about unfettered commercialism allowing sufficient enrichment or spent fuel processing technology out for weaponization barriers to be trivialized.

This is the same objection I have to the otherwise quite nifty liquid fluoride salt technologies et al. Technically quite interesting but proliferation disasters, no matter how much the proponents want them not to be.