Arms Control Wonk

March 10, 2013, marked the 35th anniversary of entry into force of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, Public Law 95-242.  Warren H. Donnelly was a Senior Specialist in the Energy, Environment and Natural Resources Policy division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS).  During his tenure he produced some of the most concise, thoughtful and well-regarded reports on the nonproliferation debates of the 1970s.  Of particular note is a report he wrote in October 1978 called “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, Public Law 95-242:  An Explanation.”  Worthy of reproduction are these paragraphs on “The Ideal Use of Nuclear Energy”:

U.S. legislation for dealing with the relation between nuclear power and nuclear weapons implies a vision of an ideal future use of nuclear power.  By reference to [the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978] and some reading between its lines—which is always an uncertain undertaking—it is possible to arrive at the following features for this ideal.

Ideally, international commerce in and domestic production of separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium, and separated uranium-233 would be avoided, at least for decades to come.  World nuclear power would be confined to use of natural or slightly enriched uranium, with terminal storage of their unreprocessed spent fuel in international facilities, or at least in national facilities under international auspices and inspection.  Plutonium would not be used as a nuclear fuel.  Nuclear supplier and user nations would have agreed upon common restrictions on nuclear trade, with no transfers of plant and equipment for enrichment or reprocessing.  They would agree to impose sanctions on nations that violate their nonproliferation commitments.  All nations would have ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and, accordingly, except for nuclear-weapon states, all would permit International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to be applied to all their nuclear activities.  Nuclear-weapon states would voluntarily place their civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.  Uniform and effective standards for physical security of nuclear materials and facilities would apply throughout the world.  Nuclear supplier nations would keep control over what is done with equipment, materials, fuels and technology that they provide, and user nations would have to get permission to transfer, to enrich, or to reprocess supplied nuclear materials, and approvals for storage of spent fuel.

The main incentives for nations to adhere to such non-proliferation commitments would be an assured, reliable supply of nuclear power plants and equipment by supplier states and of nuclear fuel by an International Nuclear Fuel Authority which might also store spent fuel.  Nations would be committed not to build new enrichment and reprocessing plants on a national basis and would place existing facilities under international auspices and inspection.  If and when reprocessing were needed, it probably would be provided by a facility under some kind of international management and control.  Nuclear safeguards of International Atomic Energy Agency…could provide timely warning of diversion.

National and international research and development would concentrate on perfection of nuclear fuel cycles that recover more of the potential energy of uranium and thorium resources while not increasing the risks of proliferation beyond that posed by the light water reactor fuel cycle with terminal storage of spent fuel.

On the whole, this ideal nuclear future would emphasize use of natural uranium or slightly enriched fuel cycles for some decades to come, with emphasis on improved fuel efficiency, and would discourage fuel cycles that involve easily accessible plutonium, U-233 or highly enriched uranium.  Commercial deployment of the plutonium breeder and of reprocessing would be deferred into the more distant future when safeguards might be improved enough to offset the proliferation risks associated with present approaches to the fast breeder reactor.  (Report 78-198 S, October 25, 1978, at pp. 1-3.)

Plus ça change? 

Donnelly’s description of an ideal nuclear future has not yet come to pass.  In the main, the features he described 35 years ago bear resemblance to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the IAEA safeguards system and U.S. policy regarding enrichment and reprocessing (ENR), with some exceptions which I will address in an additional post later this week on ENR.

For some odd reason, all comments have closed on my post on the ROK 123 agreement extension.  Since I happen to firmly believe in debate and discourse, please see my colleague Ted Jones’ comments below (italics) on the the matter and in reaction to a talk I gave on May 17.  You can see and read what I think thanks to Elaine Grossman’s piece.  I know some folks don’t agree with Ted and some folks don’t agree with me:

It is a valid point that South Korea’s commitments stand in the way of its enrichment and reprocessing (E&R) activities, though it is doubtful that South Korea considers the 1992 Joint Declaration the major impediment. In any case, I would take issue with the description of South Korea as a “gold standard state.”

Clarity and consistency about what the “gold standard” means is important for understanding its limits as a policy and its consequences for U.S. interests. The term is generally taken to mean a state’s renunciation of E&R technologies on its soil, and its acceptance of other commitments – within the context of a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. By this common understanding, the UAE remains the only gold standard country. The United States has never asked South Korea to accept the gold standard because it is an advanced nuclear country and a close strategic ally. It is highly unlikely that South Korea would have agreed to renounce its E&R rights, if the United States had asked.

The important lesson of U.S.-ROK nuclear cooperation is that a Section 123 agreement without the “gold standard” can nonetheless be an essential instrument of U.S. influence on international nuclear security and nonproliferation. The most powerful source of U.S. influence over South Korea’s E&R policies and activities is the U.S. consent right, contained in the current Section 123 agreement, over South Korea’s reprocessing of U.S.-origin fuel. The long-term successor agreement will extend this consent right to used fuel from non-U.S. reactors, and to South Korea’s enrichment and storage of plutonium or highly-enriched uranium. These consent rights, plus 8 other nonproliferation assurances and guarantees, are required in a “standard” Section 123 agreement. It is also important to note that the extensive U.S.-ROK commercial partnerships enabled by the agreement have significantly enhanced U.S. influence over nuclear energy both in South Korea and in markets, such as UAE, supplied by ROK in partnership with U.S. companies.

As the United States resumes negotiations of the long-term successor agreement with South Korea, plus 6 other renewal agreements set to expire by 2015 and new agreements with Vietnam, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it is crucial that the consequences of tying U.S. nuclear cooperation to acceptance of the gold standard are clearly understood. Among the 10 agreements, only Taiwan has indicated its willingness to forswear E&R in a Section 123 agreement. Given that Taiwan committed to the United States decades ago never to acquire E&R, its willingness to incorporate its existing commitment into a Section 123 agreement represents little change. Vietnam and Jordan have made clear that they are not interested in negotiating Section 123 agreements that would require them to forfeit E&R rights. Negotiations with both countries began in 2010. Talks with Saudi Arabia began last year, and it is doubtful whether Saudi Arabia will accept the U.S. request to forswear E&R.

When the United States refuses to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement because a country declines the gold standard, it forfeits 9 nonproliferation assurances and guarantees from that country, including consent rights that other nuclear supplier countries do not require. It also precludes U.S. companies from participating in the country’s development of nuclear energy. But withholding U.S. nuclear cooperation does not prevent the country from gaining nuclear energy technology. Both Vietnam and Jordan have already moved ahead with their nuclear energy development plans in partnership with other countries – none of which seeks the renunciation of E&R. If remains to be seen whether Saudi Arabia – which has cooperation agreements in place with France, China, South Korea and Argentina – will follow in their path.

Insistence on the gold standard has broader negative implications for the global nonproliferation regime. Countries such as South Korea, Vietnam, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are reluctant to accept the gold standard for legitimate reasons that have nothing to do with intentions to proliferate nuclear technology. As non-nuclear-weapon states, they have already forsworn nuclear weapons; as a matter of principle, they are loath to renounce also the right to make nuclear fuel. Some countries, such as Vietnam, take this position despite having no dreams of acquiring E&R capabilities. These states properly consider E&R to be within their rights to peaceful nuclear technology as provided in Article IV of the NPT. If the United States demands that they renounce E&R rights as a condition of U.S. nuclear cooperation, it will be vulnerable to charges of undermining the NPT.

The focus of recent years on the gold standard has also had the effect of exaggerating the proliferation risk posed by legal, as opposed to clandestine transfers of E&R. Only a few countries possess E&R technology and legal transfers have occurred only rarely, and with strict oversight. Since the establishment of the NSG in 1974, no NSG member has transferred E&R technologies to a state that did not already have E&R capabilities.

The case of South Korea demonstrates the limits of the gold standard as a universal policy, and the tremendous benefits to U.S. nonproliferation interests of a standard Section 123 agreement. If certain countries, such as Taiwan and UAE, readily agree to renounce E&R in a Section 123 agreement, then the United States would be foolish not to incorporate that commitment within the agreement. But if a country declines the gold standard, South Korea also illustrates the multiple benefits to U.S. national interests that may be lost by foregoing U.S. nuclear cooperation.

Over at our Proliferation Prevention Program blog, you can see what my boss and I wrote regarding “The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation at the US-ROK May 2013 Presidential Summit.”

The first result of the decision to delay for most in my former line of work is likely to be relief.  But two years is not that far away.  And in terms of difficulty, may not be enough time to agree on a longer-term, 30- or 40-year agreement if the South keeps pushing on the enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) door.  Congress has a role, and while it may be an imperfect place, our Constitution and our laws give us no other for adjudication of such matters.

It’s incumbent on the Administration to submit proposed language allowing this “extension” to come into force, and on Congress to examine it.  At a minimum, the cognizant Committees ought to hold a hearing to establish clear legislative history, just in case we find that in 2015 we see another extension of this agreement being considered along side other, tough 123 agreements.

So far, only  Voice of America has covered this matter.  Note to Jack Spencer over at Heritage.org:  What exactly is “proliferation-resistant used-fuel-management technology”?  What makes it resist proliferation?  And if it’s so good, why don’t we let everyone use it?

[Tom Moore turns a gimlet eye to what is, and what isn't, in the President's budget for nuclear modernization. LRSO = Long Range Stand Off, an Air Force program for replacement of the Air Launched Cruise Missile. -Ed.]

Modernizes the Nation’s Nuclear Deterrent. (at pp. 72-73)

The Administration remains committed to reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons in support of our national security strategy, to modernizing the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex, and to supporting the goals of the Nuclear Posture Review as the United States and Russia implement the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The Budget proposes $12 billion for strategic offensive forces, $600 million or five percent, less than the 2012 enacted level; the principal reason for the decrease was the two-year slip in the funding profile for the OHIO Class replacement. To ensure that the strategic bomber fleet will be able to conduct future missions, DOD is continuing to develop a new long-range bomber.

DOD continues to review possible reductions in delivery systems to ensure that the New START thresholds are met on schedule. Close cooperation between DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at the Department of Energy has resulted in modified weapons system requirements that focus on the highest-priority capabilities. DOD and NNSA continue to ensure that plutonium component production and research capabilities are maintained at required levels, and have increased resources for several programs to extend the service lives of nuclear weapons, as well as for one ongoing major capital asset project, the Uranium Processing Facility. Reflecting their close partnership and shared commitment, DOD continues to provide budgetary support to NNSA.

Modernizes the Nation’s Nuclear Deterrent. (at pp. 89-90)

That all sounds very nice, eh?  But, a hem, what  about this?–You know, the “90-day review”?

Wonks of all stripes:  Keep your eyes fixed on plans for LRSO, as rumorint has it that certain folks might like not to proceed with it.

Also, note that the “unprecedented cooperative analysis and planning process jointly conducted by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense (DOD)”  hasn’t resulted in saving the taxpayer a dime, nor in better managing the deterrent.  This is, in large part, due to what Congress does with the money that DOD gives the NNSA, and, in turn, NNSA’s inability to work to get a better grip on the requirements-generation process for the B-61 LEP.

A modest proposal:  The Administration should announce a halt to its arms control agenda until it conducts an assessment of how it will obtain what it requests from Congress for modernization.  Keep implementing New START, but comb through the Complex for savings that can be rolled into programs.  Then, go to the  appropriators with that sum, declare that it’s only for modernization, and to get us back on track (with 2010 projected numbers), by agreeing to await the outcome of the modernization campaign before agreeing any additional reductions or making any unilateral force changes.  If Congress balks on that, then we might well be able to place blame where it belongs for modernization failure.

You’re either part of the problem, part of the solution or part of the scenery in life.

As things stand, the President ought to do more to talk about these issues with the Congress, rather than an adoring international public.  He’s got his Nobel.  Now he needs to demonstrate he can govern.

The FY14 process (and FYDP and FYNSP) is the make-or-break year for holding together arms control and modernization.   Funny thing:  Lots of folks don’t like either idea.  Good luck living in that world.

During a panel at today’s Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Acting U/S for Arms Control and International Security Gottemoeller flatly stated “We are not modernizing.”  She may have meant warheads, or something else, but it was succinct.  And damaging.  It’s damaging because it needs urgent clarification–if this budget cycle shows further degradation of the modernization commitments made in 2010, it will kill arms control.

Having played a bit part in the work that lead to the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent to the New START Treaty, I think it would have been nice to know where we are now, then.  Particularly given what we were told in 2010.

The seven major laboratories and production plants, plus the Nevada Test Site, must be able maintain a responsive, sustainable capability to support modernization and sustainment of our nuclear warheads in the absence of nuclear testing.  Likewise, we must maintain credible and effective warhead delivery capability for the warheads the weapons complex sustains.

In 2008, citing concerns from the directors of our national laboratories, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, and the Commander of Strategic Command, Kevin Chilton, stated in a letter to the then-Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that “The United States is the only nuclear weapons state not currently modernizing its nuclear capabilities and supporting infrastructure.”

 They made that statement in 2008, following several years of contentious, political and rarely useful debate over funding our nuclear weapons complex.  Starting in 2009, this tide began to change.  The credit goes first to the bipartisan Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, chaired by former Defense Secretaries Schlesinger and Perry, which noted in its final report that

So long as modernization proceeds within the  framework of existing U.S. policy, it should encounter minimum political difficulty.

Then, in a speech in September 2009, Secretary Gates made clear his views on how modernization should proceed, and its explicit linkage with arms control.  He stated we needed to increase our investments in our national nuclear labs and that we did not seek new capabilities but rather a credible way forward on existing weapons.  He summarized the critical link between modernization and the New START Treaty:

 I also believe that these capabilities are enablers of arms control and our ability to reduce the size of our  nuclear stockpile.  When we have more confidence in the long-term viability of our weapons systems, then our       ability to reduce the number of weapons we must keep in the stockpile is enhanced.  So I see this modernization  effort, if you will, as a vehicle and an enabler of arms  control and stockpile reduction.

Republicans were/are assured of $85 billion over the next 10 years for the Complex, and for delivery vehicles, $100 billion over the next decade.  Lifetime extensions for our warheads were funded and plans were on the table for modernization of delivery vehicles.

In the cover letter to the April 2010 NPR, Secretary Gates stated that, with regard to planning, programming and budgeting for the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex,

These investments, and the NPR’s strategy for warhead life extension, represent a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the nuclear      infrastructure and support our Nation’s deterrent. They will also enable further arms reductions by allowing us to hedge against future threats without the need for a large non-deployed stockpile.

The Directors of the Los Alamos, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories wrote in 2010 that:

[W]e believe that the proposed budgets provide adequate support to sustain the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of America’s nuclear deterrent within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads established by the New START Treaty with adequate confidence and acceptable risk.

They also said that the plan as laid out:

clearly responds to many of the concerns that we and others have voiced in the past about potential future- year funding shortfalls, and it substantially reduces  risks to the overall program.

Now, we understand that plans are on the table to rid ourselves of almost all of these commitments.

We are now come to the critical years.  With problems in each leg of the American Triad, an un-self-effacing Prague agenda in the Oval Office, and modernizing nuclear powers the world over, our extended and basic deterrent is threatened.  At present rates, and given the failures of the B-61 Lifetime Extension Program, we are approaching a deterrent cliff:  Most delivery systems now in the force will face maximum operating lives within the next two decades—and they will take decades to replace.

Maybe someone should ask Gottemoeller to clarify her remark, and maybe we should read the budget more carefully than ever before.

I look forward to working on the questions raised in all my posts, and indeed in those of my colleagues, in my new capacity as Deputy Director of (and Senior Fellow with) the Proliferation Prevention Program at CSIS.

Having been the beneficiary of many patient and knowledgable folks over the years, I view the term “expert” as a sobriquet, finding more merit in the appellation “student.”  I will try not to take myself too seriously and look forward to new lessons.

I have enjoyed Jeffrey’s invitation to blog and am grateful.  Having now blogged, I am also on Twitter (@ThomasCSIS).  Twitter could be an experience, too.

T.M.

Some have taken to respected pages to discuss the Administration’s purported next set of nuclear weapons decisions.  As the fourth anniversary of the President’s Prague speech nears, advocates are petitioning and pushing the President to make deep cuts in American nuclear weapons, perhaps down to 1,000 to 1,100 deployed warheads.  Given difficulties in verifying nuclear warhead eliminations, as well as Russian resistance to new, legally-binding limits for reduction (of offensive, not defensive weapons, and shorter-range, or theater nuclear weapons) what appears likely is a unilateral announcement that by a date certain (but before January 2017, or for some period of time?) the United States will deploy not more or less than a number or range of numbers the interagency decides it can handle and Russia can answer, relying on existing verification to do the work of providing confidence about lower limits.

The fact that public advice now argues for an executive agreement is revealing.  The presumption is you cannot obtain Senate consent to go lower.  That was revealed in 2010–the price for going lower then, and not until 2018, was deemed too high by advocates of going lower, even while they supported 1,550 deployed warheads by February 2018.  Now, one is too high, the other, too far off (for some).

It is not without approximate precedent to do as described above.  There is a rough analogue:  The Vladivostok Agreement.  Carter faced an expensive modernization choice he didn’t like and ultimately insufficient support in his own party for going lower.  There is little difference between Obama and Carter when one considers the Prague speech.  There is some degree of commonality in their economic woes.  The terms of Vladivostok sound very similar to what is guessed at, above.  Yet, if the motivating factor in seeking an executive agreement, instead of an amendment to New START, is to avoid the need for two-thirds of the Senate, then we ought to ask ourselves why and what that would mean–it is not clearly the case that Congress would have no role and it is more certainly the case that there is not a majority in the House willing to bless lower numbers.

Whether Russia might accede is also in doubt, so to go lower without obtaining something in return strikes me as an incomplete idea.  It might be wise to step back and ponder what’s happened since Vladivostok in terms of extant practice in order to better understand why it may be the case that New START could end up as the strategic warhead limitation treaty or SWHaLT, and why that might not work.  It might also be wise to focus on verification needed to go lower before going lower, particularly given the amount of time we have before 2018 and the uncertainty we have about our own modernization, replacement or maintenance of the weapons we have now.  We might also wonder about what it is we are trying to (a) reduce, (b) limit or (c) eliminate, how each is verified, and (d) what is to be retained and/or limited inside and outside limits.

Arms control aims to reduce the risk of use, but it does not proscribe it.  Nor does it mandate eliminating anything even if it permits taking a look to make sure an item has been eliminated from accountability.  The best task of arms control has been to detect the signals of intention in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war, not to end all wars nor to get rid of all nuclear weapons.

I take exception with the view that “arms control is back” because an Administration might want to go lower.  There is a push for unilaterally-imposed reduction without enough regard for verifiable limitation, at least from the outside.  One could argue this is not so bad:  Unilateral decisions can be reversed, no?  Not really, at least not for nuclear weapons.  Nor for the verification of decisions involving them, to say nothing of postponing the verification questions for later, after disarmament.

The choice to restore a weapon or a number of them covertly or overtly sends a signal that may be detected or announced.  To the extent such a choice violates an agreement, it could be reversed, but that is harder to do than one might suppose.  The military significance of a violation is ultimately a policy decision.  But any suitable arms control regime ought to try to detect violation before militarily significant advantage can result based on the limits imposed.  At very low numbers, the policy judgement might sway toward significance more often than not, unless one never wants to admit the possibility, or the means have not been provided to make sound judgments regarding significance.

Four brief questions arise if Vladivostok II/SWhaLT I is the option:

(1) Does it require amending the New START Treaty?

(2) Under U.S. statute, does it require a treaty be submitted to the Senate–i.e., is such a reduction militarily significant?

(3) Does it require a new assessment as to its degree of verifiability under U.S. statute (same link as previously placed, in the same law)?

(4) Would Congress have to approve it by joint House-Senate resolution?–If so, could Congress insist on changes to the agreement, or to New START?

Backup Material     

New START did away with limits and attendant obligations determined to be applicable only to the Cold War, whether because of perception or reality.  I don’t mean aggregate force levels, I mean detailed sub-limitations on throw-weight, re-entry vehicle attribution to declared missile types, full telemetric data exchange, on-site continuous monitoring of a solid rocket motor integration facility and more.  They were not perfect, but they were the best that could be done to count, declare and confirm under the INF Treaty and START I.

As change unfolds, a calculation based on the numbers and types of weapons (in which category launchers and delivery vehicle used to matter more) and numbers and types of inspections (which is all that New START has, next to declarations) for the probability of detecting violation becomes complicated by going lower and not changing the treaty.

In this scenario, I am assuming the Parties make independent, unilateral statements that they will deploy no more than 1,000 to 1,1000 warheads, relying on the New START treaty to verify that, with no change in the obligations under that treaty and/or pending a new one.  Ability to “upload” in response might not necessarily be eliminated under a reasonable approach to reduction, but that is not clearly what the advocates want, at least in the United States.  At 1,000 the variances in new weapons might make noncompliance more severe because the limits are lower and because daily deterrence, extended deterrence and reassurance are tighter.  Noncompliance involving tens of missiles could amount to hundreds of warheads that count for more advantage outside lower limits.  This is, of course, true at 1,550, too, but the significance of unilateral American limitation and/or violation of the other party grows large if we mean to eliminate capability and warheads, as is proposed, on our own.

Moreover, the preoccupation with warheads imposes difficult verification questions.  If you want confidence regarding limited warheads, then you probably need a better idea of how many fit on a deployed delivery vehicle than you might have in the future.  That could mean moving away from flexible rules for bomber-accountable weapons.  It could mean you fiddle, again, with the idea of what a deployed weapon really is, but that will mean choices involving tradeoffs for sovereignty that nobody has yet made.  It does mean, however, in my opinion, that you’d need more than we presently have available under existing obligations for a confident judgement about 1,000 total deployed warheads.  New START was sold on the basis that it treated non-deployed weapons lightly and didn’t require any choices for a long time that could result in asymmetric reduction before its Article II obligations had to be met.  That was made crystal clear in 2010.

I have appended a portion of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations START I report to this post to give the reader a sense for how one might begin to better understand what is meant.  Note well, due to the combinations of START I inspections in New START, you cannot make a direct extrapolation based on the inspection number in the 1992 report excerpted because New START combines a data-update inspection with re-entry vehicle onsite inspection or RVOSI.  You cannot directly compare since there is no warhead attribution in New START.  So, why bother?

Because it might give you a more accurate sense of what START I inspections could reasonably do and might lead you to wonder what the successor to New START might try to do.  My own view is that you should try to get more if you are contemplating lower deployment with newer systems in Russia not previously declared under START I but that have been deployed since 2009.  You might even want to do more than START I allowed, depending on how many new types of items and locations are involved.  You might want to focus on the purpose of inspections, too, and the fact that there only ten per treaty year for deployed weapons under New START.

Even though Russia may only have 35 sites as compared to almost 70 in the past, if one adds new types of missiles with no declared throw-weights and less than full telemetric data exchanged regarding flight testing (and if one is a glutton for probability calculations, non-strategic nuclear warheads, too, governed also in new limits) the analysis would presumably support a need for more verification that involved more than warhead counting but also delivery vehicle capacity.  More inspections would not hurt, but inspections do nothing more in present practice than confirm what is known, based on treaty declarations and national technical independent verification.  If one is contemplating going lower than 1,550, with no change in extant obligations with respect to new, lower limits, then one is not serious about the lower limit.

The United States may take its unilateral chances as it may, but it ought to get something for them.  If present policy is to rest on narrow, amalgamated limitation and verification, we might be more honest about what we have, now, before going lower.

Verification is not a form of disorder–it is not a mania.   At very low numbers it becomes more, not less, important.  It is notable that the Four Statesmen have now put some focus back on verification.

Trust is also not a predicate for verification, even if it may result from it.  But if you purposefully seek reduction without it, or put priority on it after you go lower, you may find yourself in the unenviable position of losing trust as well as finding yourself with no means to restore it.  The focus on Russia is due to the fact that we have no other agreements nor any substantial record of verification, implementation and compliance on which to rely.  What are the things we seek to limit there, now?  If we are only focused on reduction, are we sure they are, as well?  Do we understand, now, where they will be in 2018?  If we do not have something like Nunn-Lugar, how much will we know about what is eliminated?

There are two agendas described here–one that might be the Administration’s choice and another that it has embraced.  The third, arms control, is not a focus of either.

Appended Material

U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The START Treaty, Report with Additional Views to Accompany Treaty Doc. 102-20 and Treaty Doc. 102-32. 102nd Congress, 2d Session, 1992.  Senate Exec. Rept. 102-53, pp. 46-48.  (Material has been edited to correct typos in the original, published report):

How many inspections are enough?

Data update inspections.  The Treaty allows 15 data update inspections each treaty year.  If the number of C.I.S. declared sites available for these inspections remained at about 68, there would be on average a visit to one-fourth of the site[s] each year.  If Russia remains the only nuclear-weapons state republic, and it has some 45 sites, then up to one-third of the sites would be inspected each year.  Since information from NTM would guide these OSIs to the more suspicious, or the more important declared sites, the relative effectiveness of OSIs would be enhanced beyond the one in three ratio.  If the Russians were to attempt a break-out of the Treaty, they would undoubtedly need to cheat at several sites in order to gain a large numerical advantage, thus increasing their risk from the additional sites.  From the point of view of the Russians, they would have to face this considerable risk since they would not know if they would be discovered by NTM, OSIs [,] human intelligence or defectors.

Reentry vehicle inspections.  If the Russians were to consider violating the RV-counting rule provisions, they would probably do it in large scale on just a few types of systems (SS-18, or downloaded SLBMs) in order to gain many extra warheads.  In order to gain a statistical perspective on this type of cheating, the Committee asked the following question for the record: Assume that the Russians deploy 14 RVs, instead of 10, on 25 of its 154 SS-18s. How many OSIs would it take to have a 50% (75%, 95%) confidence of detection of one violation?  What are the limits of this type of calculation?

In January 1992, the Administration responded: The following table shows the number of OSIs required to detect one violation out of 25 at different confidence levels:

The key factor for this type of calculation is the number of violations assumed.  The number of violations regarded as significant is a policy judgment, not a technical one.  However, two important assumptions in assessing OSI are: 1) that the selection of missiles for RV OSI is completely random (the Russians cannot influence our selection in any way), and 2) that inspections of “illegal” silos cannot be foiled, or prevented on some pretext, by the inspected Party.  START provisions concerning pre-inspection restrictions, time limits for transporting inspectors to the designated site, and use of satellite navigation aids, add to the difficult[y] a Party would confront in attempting to foil RV OSI.

The probability of detection of this violation of 100 warheads should be compared to the national security implication of the violation.  The violation discussed above would increase the number of actual Russian warheads under START from a projected 7,000 warheads under START to 7,100 warheads with this level of cheating.  The effectiveness of this violation would be calculated by the additional effect of the 100 warheads on U.S. targets.  These results by the Executive Branch are consistent with the attached graphs from the Office of Technology Assessment.

Statistics of inspections.  In the above discussion we have quoted the chance of being caught on a random, statistical basis.  Some of the limitations of this approach are as follows:  These calculations do not depend on the size of the anomaly on each missile.  What is intended here is that these are clear-cut anomalies that are observable.  There are a number of factors that can make this calculations both more optimistic, or more pessimistic, requiring either more or fewer OSIs to obtain a condition of reality for the necessary confidence.  For example: (1) For random statistics, we have assumed that each violation will be detected if the RV OSI picks the particular missile for inspection.  In order to determine whether the Russians could hide the violation, one must examine:  The time lines of the inspection to determine the time available to the Russians to cheat, the availability of NTM assets to observe the cheating, and the availability of equipment to remove the extra RVs.  If the Russians were able to cheat under certain circumstances, more OSIs would be needed. (2) The site of the OSIs will most likely not be chosen randomly, but their choice will be aided by NTM, human intelligence, other data or by detectors.  This kind of information would allow the targeting of OSIs to locations where the likelihood of violations would be higher. This effect would improve probabilities beyond that of random statistics and, thus, reduce the number of OSIs that would be needed to obtain the required degree of certainty.

Are there enough OSIs?  In order to determine whether the number of on-site inspections is sufficient to effectively verify the START Treaty, it is necessary to compare the monitorability as determined by intelligence estimates or by statistical arguments given above, and then assess whether the militar[y] significance of the additional warheads changes (1) deterrence as measured in the survivability of U.S. strategic forces, or (2) the threat to U.S. population[.]

Questions for the Record Submitted to

Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller by

Senator Roland W. Burris (#4)

Senate Armed Services Committee

July 29, 2010

Question:

Secretary Gottemoeller, in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) there will be an annual quota of 18 inspections, instead of 28 as under the START I, and only 35 sites are eligible for inspection instead of the 70 sites under the START I.  Can you describe why these reductions are in our best interest?

Answer:

The New START Treaty verification provisions are tailored to verify the requirements of the New START Treaty, which are different from the START Treaty requirements.

The New START Treaty provides for an annual quota of up to 18 short notice, on-site inspections to aid in verifying Russian compliance with its Treaty obligations.  These inspections will provide U.S. inspectors with 18 opportunities per year to select from among declared Russian strategic forces facilities to verify the accuracy of Russian data declarations and to deter cheating.  Although the new Treaty provides for fewer inspections than the annual quota of 28 permitted under the original START Treaty, the number of facilities for which Russia provided site diagrams and which will therefore be inspectable under the New START Treaty (35) is also significantly lower than the number of inspectable facilities in the former Soviet Union when the START Treaty entered into force (70).  As explained in the response to QFR #5 below, this is due to the fact that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are not Parties to New START, as well as that Russia now has fewer facilities where strategic offensive arms are located than it had when START entered into force.

The New START Treaty annual inspection quota includes 10 Type One inspections of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms, which will be conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.  Type One inspections combine many of the aspects associated with two different types of inspections that were conducted separately under the START Treaty; specifically, reentry vehicle on-site inspections and data update inspections.  Thus, fewer inspections annually at the operating bases will achieve many of the results of the previous START Treaty inspection regime.  The quota also includes eight Type Two inspections focused on non-deployed, converted, or eliminated strategic systems, which will be conducted at facilities such as storage sites, test ranges, and conversion or elimination facilities, as well as formerly declared facilities.

The Administration assessed the number of Type One and Type Two inspections needed annually to meet U.S. inspection objectives as the nature of these inspection types emerged during the New START negotiations.  These assessments ultimately concluded that an annual quota of 18 such inspections would be adequate to meet U.S. inspection needs.

In a little-noticed press release, the U.S. Department of Justice announced last December that it had won a guilty plea from the China Nuclear Industry Huaxing Construction Co. Ltd. (or simply Huaxing) for its criminal conspiracy to export to Pakistan’s Chashma II Nuclear Power Plant from the United States high-performance epoxy coatings in violation of U.S. law.  The DOJ press release stated:

It is believed that today’s plea marks the first time that a PRC corporate entity has entered a plea of guilty in a U.S. criminal export matter.

The details of the criminal conspiracy read like standard stuff for those accustomed to the laws in question, and how they are violated.  Until you consider the sentence above.

It is no small matter.  If China cooperated in this case, that’s worthy of note.  If they did, why and how, and what else (if anything) was learned as a result about China’s nonproliferation policies and the strength of its commitment to them?

China won membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 on the back of many promises made, and at the time, the question in everyone’s mind was what else do they want for Pakistan, after the Chashma I and II NPPs? (Chashma III and IV, naturally.)

Also, with some recent reports surfacing to the effect that China and Turkey are now supporting Pakistan’s entry into the NSG, the question arises, is Pakistan to be admitted to the NSG?

China won a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement (a 123 agreement) with the United States based on its nonproliferation policy, or one should say revisions made thereto over the course of 13 years.  It took the Executive branch from 1985 to 1998 to certify to Congress pursuant to Public Law 99-183 (the law approving the China 123 agreement, as well as relevant sections in the Tiananmen sanctions law) that:

The Government of the People’s Republic of China has provided additional information concerning its nuclear nonproliferation policies and that, based on this and all other information available to the United States Government, the People’s Republic of China is not in violation of paragraph (2) of section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Now, does the epoxy conspiracy cast doubt on Chinese nonproliferation policy–i.e., the policy that was the subject of the 1998 determination/certification–or, if there was Chinese cooperation, does it highlight a rare case of cooperation in such matters?

What is the present position of the U.S. government on further Chinese nuclear exports to Pakistan beyond Chashma I and II?

Has any information that was obtained by the U.S. government in connection with the epoxy conspiracy caused the U.S. government to review whether or not China is or may be in violation of section 129?  (That’s very unlikely to be the case:  Chashma I and II were “grandfathered” at the time of the PRC’s entry into the NSG, and given that they are both safeguarded under Pakistan’s INFCIRC/66 agreement, as civilian NPPs, China is unlikely to be in violation of section 129 concerning lawful exports to either NPP; and the plea makes no mention of items or conduct falling under section 129.  The nexus, however, between the Huaxing plea and the complicated past and present PRC-Pakistan nuclear relationship raises its profile.)

It doesn’t take a law degree or years of asking questions of any administration to know that the answers to the above questions are probably:  Not really; we don’t like it, but prefer not to discuss it; and no.  With 29 reactors under construction in China, some of them under U.S. license (the first reactor export licenses not being issued until 2004, and with key contracts on the line in 2013-2015), some would no doubt prefer not to highlight this case.

If the guilty plea rests on PRC cooperation, that’s something that the Justice Department could probably detail before (a) the expiration of the U.S.-China 123 agreement in 2015 and (b) the PRC-Turkey bid, if it’s real, results in Pakistani membership in the NSG, or the crafting of U.S. instructions for the U.S. representative to the NSG on the matter are finalized.

For the discerning reader, the work of Dr. Stephen Blank has always been a favorite.

Dr. Blank has recently published an article, which may be obtained free of charge, here, at the Jamestown Foundation’s webpage.  Of particular note is the attention he draws to the potential sale of Russian heavy bombers and ALCMs to the PRC.  And of particular interest to the reader may be this quote:  ”China apparently now argues the main requirement for such a bomber is that it carries more long-distance cruise missiles.”

And further,

[I]f Moscow supplied the Kh-22 (NATO designation: As-4 Kitchen) supersonic air-delivered cruise missile, this long-range anti-ship cruise missile could change the balance in the South China Sea (OSC-FBIS, January 26; China News Center, January 24; Vzgliad Online, January 22).

It is worth thinking about the present state of both ALCM and SLCM technology, the world over.  A good deal has been said in the past year about increasing tension in Asia, be it Chinese territorial claims, strains between U.S. allies, and of course, the DPRK.  But not much is said about the kind of technology the PRC would need, and from where it is getting it, to enable it to deal with the U.S. “pivot.”

Tonight, the President said:  ”At the same time, we will engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals, and continue leading the global effort to secure nuclear materials that could fall into the wrong hands–because our ability to influence others depends on our willingness to lead.”

Dear Jeffrey:  Does this quote solve this problem, if it ever was one?